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THE FORMER TESTIMONY HEARSAY
EXCEPTION: A STUDY IN RULEMAKING,
JUDICIAL REVISIONISM, AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS
GLEN WEISSENBERGERt
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b) (1), the former testimony hearsay
exception, has been the subject of more divergent judicial interpretations
than virtually any other provision of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Some courts have viewed the rule as valuing accuracy above all, and
have admitted almost any relevant evidence. Other courts have identi-
fied fairness as the policy underlying the rule, and have admitted only
evidence that does not deprive litigants of adversarial rights. Professor
Weissenberger demonstrates that Congress intended fairness considera-
tions to govern interpretations of rule 804(b)(1). He then calls on the
Supreme Court to provide a definitive interpretation of the rule, in order
to force lower courts to honor a congressional policy decision, and to
resolve a conflict among the circuits.
I. INTRODUCTION
Enacted on January 2, 1975, to provide a comprehensive and uniform ap-
proach to evidentiary matters in the federal courts, the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence1 were the culmination of a rulemaking process which spanned more than
a decade and which involved the Supreme Court and both houses of Congress.
2
t Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati. J.D. 1972, Harvard; B.A. 1969, University of
Cincinnati. Professor Weissenberger wishes to express appreciation to Sara Rorer and Marilyn
Maag for their assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1. Federal Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, Act of January 2,
1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1296. Signing the Act, President Gerald R. Ford stated: "I have
approved H.R. 5463, a bill establishing for the first time in our history uniform rules of evidence on
the admissibility of proof in Federal court proceedings." Presidential Statement, 11 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. I (January 3, 1975). The uniformity interest is not tantamount to static conformity. As
stated in Federal Rule of Evidence 102:
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifi-
able expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence
to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.
FED. R. EvID. 102. It has been suggested that rule 102 provides an exception to the rule that
statutes in derogation of common law are to be strictly construed. According to this theory, rule 102
encourages judicial discretion in evidentiary matters. See M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 102.1 (1981). For further discussion of rule 102, see infra notes 203-07 and accompa-
nying text.
2. Chief Justice Warren instigated the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1961
when he appointed a Special Committee on Evidence from the existing Advisory Committee to the
Judicial Conference to consider the desirability and feasibility of a uniform code of evidence for the
federal courts. In response to the affirmative recommendation of the Special Committee's 1963 Final
Report, Chief Justice Warren appointed an Advisory Committee in 1965 to draft the Federal Rules
of Evidence. Three drafts of the Rules were published and circulated for comment from the bench
and bar between 1969 and 1973 before final promulgation by the Supreme Court and submission to
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The Rules were promulgated by the Court on November 20, 1972,3 and were
transmitted to Congress on February 5, 1973.4 Congress extended the effective
date of the Rules and simultaneously conditioned their enactment on express
congressional approval.5 Thereafter, Congress proceeded to revise the Supreme
Court's version of the Rules in significant areas, an action unprecedented in the
recent history of the Rules governing federal courts.
Multiple contributions by the House, the Senate, and the Supreme Court in
drafting, interpreting, and redrafting the Rules have resulted in divergent appli-
cations of rule 804(b)(1), the hearsay exception governing the admissibility of
former testimony from unavailable declarants.6 Rule 804(b)(1) 7 provides for the
Congress. See 10 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 10-15 (2d ed. 1976); 21 C. WRIGHT & K.
GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5006 (1977); see also Friedenthal, The
Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 673 (1975)
(discussing the decline of the Supreme Court's autonomy in the wake of Congress' entry into the
rulemaking arena); Martin, Inherent Judicial Power: Flexibility Congress Did Not Write Into the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 57 TEx. L. REV. 167 (1979) (focusing on the question whether, or to
what extent, a federal court is bound by congressional restrictions on the power of the courts to
admit evidence); Moore & Bendix, Congress, Evidence and Rulemaking, 84 YALE L.J. 9 (1974)
(analyzing and comparing the versions of the Rules proposed by Congress and the Court); Com-
ment, Rules of Evidence and the Federal Practice: Limits on the Supreme Court's Rulemaking Power,
1974 ARIz. ST. L.J. 77. [hereinafter Comment, Rulemaking] (exploring the validity of "substantive-
ness" as a standard for evaluating the extent of the Court's rulemaking power); Comment, Separa-
tion of Powers and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1059 (1975) [hereinafter
Comment, Powers] (proposing an arrangement whereby the conflict surrounding Supreme Court
promulgation of arguably substantive rules might be resolved, permitting the judiciary to promulgate
procedural evidentiary rules, and the legislature to enact privilege rules).
3. 56 F.R.D. 183 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas dissented on the grounds
that the Rules were outside the scope of the enabling act and that the Court was acting as "a mere
conduit" between a committee of laymen and Congress. Id. at 185. For further discussion of the
controversy surrounding the Supreme Court's promulgation of these rules, see infra notes 160-64
and accompanying text.
4. The Rules Enabling Act provided that the Rules would/not become effective until the expi-
ration of 90 days after submission to Congress. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
5. Act of March 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (87
Stat.) 11.
6. For a discussion of courts' varied interpretations of the differences between the Supreme
Court's and Congress' versions of rule 804(b)(1), see infra notes 115-43 & 153-54 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of Congress' rulemaking authority to alter the Supreme Court's version of rule
804(b)(1), see infra notes 166-82 and accompanying text.
It should be noted that commentators disagree as to whether former testimony should be cate-
gorized as hearsay. See C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 254, at 760 (Cleary 3d ed.
1984) (views former testimony as an exception to the hearsay rule because of "[c]ross-examination,
oath, the solemnity of the occasion, and in the case of transcribed testimony the accuracy of repro-
duction of the words spoken"); 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
804(b)(1)[01], at 804-5 (1984) (describes former testimony as "more reliable than many of the excep-
tions encountered in rule 803, since both the conditions of oath and cross-examination are satis-
fied"); 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1370 (Chadbourn rev. 1974)
(considers former testimony nonhearsay when initially there was an opportunity to cross-examine).
7. Rule 804(b)(1) provides:
(b) Hearsay Exceptions.-The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declar-
ant is unavailable as a witness:
(1) Former Testimony.-Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same
or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course
of the same or another proceedings, if the party against whom the testimony is now
offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportu-
nity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect
examination.
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). Unavailability is defined by rule 804(a) to include a witness' inability or
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admission of certain forms of testimony given at prior proceedings despite the
absence of the traditional safeguards which attend live testimony and which en-
sure accuracy and fairness.8 Courts and commentators disagree as to which
underlying policy consideration best justifies the allowance rule 804(b)(1) makes
for the absence of the ideal testimonial conditions9 of oath, observation of de-
meanor, and immediate cross-examination.10 Some commentators lean toward
an "expansive" approach to the admission of prior testimony, which would af-
ford courts access to virtually all relevant information.1 1 The "expansive" ap-
proach rests on the premise that evidentiary reconstructions of past events
should be directed toward the exposition of accurate facts. 12 This position is in
tension with the "restrictive" approach rooted in the common law, which em-
phasizes fairness to the individual litigant, focusing on the adversarial rights of
parties.1 3 The fairness considerations of the restrictive approach tend to protect
refusal to testify based on: (1) claim of privilege; (2) persistent refusal despite a court order; (3) lack
of memory; (4) death, physical or mental illness, or infirmity; or (5) absence, the circumstances of
which render the proponent of his statement unable to procure his attendance. Hearsay is defined in
rule 801(c) as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
8. The traditional indicia of the reliability of testimony are: (1) that it was given under oath;
(2) that the witness was physically present so that the court could observe his demeanor; and (3) that
the adverse party had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness. G. WEISSENBERGER, WEIS-
SENBERGER'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 801.1 (1987); 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 1362; see Martin,
The Former-Testimony Exception in the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 57 IOWA L. REV. 547,
550 (1972).
9. The oath, the presence of an opposing attorney, and the fact that the witness' testimony is
being recorded verbatim by a reporter all contribute to the aura of formality around the taking of a
deposition. In-court testimony has the additional attribute of the judge and jury observing the wit-
ness' demeanor within the courtroom setting. G. WEISSENBERGER, supra note 8.
10. Wigmore refers to cross-examination as "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the
discovery of truth." 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 1367; see also In re Paducah Towing Co., 692
F.2d 412, 418 (6th Cir. 1982) (fairness requires a meaningful opportunity to fully examine an adverse
witness). For a full analysis of this concern in rule 804(b)(1), see 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
supra note 6, 804(b)(1)[03].
11. See G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 74 (2d ed. 1987); C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 256; 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 6, 804(b)(1)[04]; see
also Evans, Article Eight of the Federal Rules of Evidence: The Hearsay Rule, 8 VAL. U.L. REv. 261
(1974) (discussing generally the Rules of Evidence); Falknor, Former Testimony and the Uniform
Rules: A Comment, 38 N.Y.U. L. REv. 651 (1963) (discussing the "identity of parties" require-
ment); Martin, supra note 8, at 550 (discussing generally the former testimony exception).
12. Generally, courts within a civil-law system tend to value the interest of accuracy in finding
ultimate facts more highly than considerations of fairness to the individual litigant. In the criminal
jurisdiction context, this inquisitorial model may be compared to the accusatorial or adversarial
system in common-law jurisdictions where individual litigants are responsible for collecting and
presenting evidence. The dichotomy is relevant to this discussion as it reflects the placement of
emphasis in evidentiary policy: on the discovery of "truth" or, in the alternative, on personal auton-
omy and fairness. See Certoma, The Accusatory System v. The Inquisitorial System: Procedural
Truth v. Fact, 56 AUSTL. L.J. 288 (1982); Neef & Nagel, The Adversary Nature of the American
Legal System from a Historical Perspective, 20 N.Y.L.F. 123 (1974). For an evaluation of this prem-
ise in the context of the admission of extrinsic act evidence, see Weissenberger, Making Sense of
Extrinsic Act Evidence: Federal Evidence Rule 404(b), 70 IOWA L. REv. 579 (1985).
13. Under the common-law adversarial system, the determination of the admissibility and the
weight of evidence are governed by a set of complex rules. Thejudge serves as an impartial modera-
tor, interpreting the law and enforcing the procedural rules to ensure fairness. Neef & Nagel, supra
note 12, at 126. The adversarial system is grounded in the theory that the "fairest decision can be
obtained when the two parties to the immediate conflict argue in open court according to carefully
prescribed rules and procedures." Id. Historically, the adversarial system has been closely related to
the use of the jury, a legally untrained tribunal, as fact-finder. See Certoma, supra note 12, at 288;
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an adversary, whereas an accuracy-dominant system based on the expansive ap-
proach may deprive a party of invaluable proof.14 Proponents of the expansive
approach are likely to view the courts as the finders of objective facts,15 and
proponents of the restrictive approach will view the courts as the arbiters of
rights between the two parties in conflict.
1 6
The potency of prior testimony evidence justifies the more restrictive ap-
proach to the admissibility of prior testimony. This more cautious position ap-
plies in the adversarial context in which the presentation of evidence is subject to
tactical considerations and maneuvers of the attorneys pursuing their clients'
best interests. An attorney examining or cross-examining a witness in a subse-
quent proceeding may adopt a different strategy than the attorney in a prior
proceeding, though the issues litigated and the motives for cross-examination
might betray no disaccord. In addition, the attorney in a prior proceeding might
be comparatively less skilled or, worse yet, patently incompetent. Moreover, the
attorney in the prior proceeding might consider the issue to which the witness is
testifying so peripheral that she may not sufficiently test the witness' testi-
mony. 17 From this perspective, it would appear unfair to allow the introduction
of adverse testimony from a prior proceeding that a party in a subsequent pro-
ceeding had not personally had the opportunity to develop by direct, cross-, or
redirect examination. The adversary process, under this restrictive view, gives a
party his own day in court-not someone else's.
As amended and ultimately enacted by Congress, rule 804(b)(1) restricts
the admission of former testimony to those instances in which a party or a
party's "predecessor in interest" had an opportunity and a similar motive to
see also infra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of the jury on the development
of evidentiary rules). In criminal proceedings, the adversarial system provides, first, substantial pro-
tection to the accused by requiring that defendants be convicted when guilt is beyond a reasonable
doubt, and second, that a fair trial requires the opportunity to rebut adverse evidence. See Michel-
son v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948). For a discussion of practices of subordinating accu-
racy to fairness that characterize the Anglo-American adversarial system of justice, see infra notes
26-32 and accompanying text.
14. It is possible that this would have been the result in the Johns-Manville asbestosis cases,
infra notes 125-44 and accompanying text.
15. This perception reflects the policy considerations of the civil law inquisitorial system rather
than the common-law adversarial model. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text (comparing
the inquisitorial system with the accusatorial system).
16. This position reflects the traditional approach to common-law trials. When construing the
"predecessor in interest" requirement of rule 804(b)(1), federal courts must recognize that judicial
alteration of the adversarial system affects the personal autonomy of the parties. See supra notes 12-
13 & infra notes 26-32 and accompanying text (discussing fairness as a predominant policy concern
in common-law adjudication).
17. See, eg., Charles H. Demarest, Inc. v. United States, 174 F. Supp. 380, 389 (Cust. Ct. 1959)
(discussing problems of possible inferior cross-examination in former case); see also Falknor, supra
note 11, at 655-60 (discussing the right of confrontation in criminal cases). This concern was spcifi-
cally addressed by the drafters of rule 804(b)(1) on the Hungate Subcommittee. Subcommittee
members were concerned that a party might be "charged with the incompetence of some other
party's lawyer, who did not know how to examine and botched the case." Mark-up Session No. 13-3,
Federal Rules of Evidence, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, House of Representatives, June 5,
1973, transcribed in Weissenberger, The Admissibility of Grand Jury Transcripts: Avoiding the Con-
stitutional Issue, 59 TUL. L. REv. 335, 354-55 (1984) [hereinafter Mark-up Session]. Similarly, they
feared a party would not be adequately protected if the prior case was inconsequential and issues
relevant to the current party's case were therefore not raised. See id.
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develop the testimony.' 8 The version of rule 804(b)(1) promulgated by the
Supreme Court of the United States and superceded by Congress, however, re-
quired only that some litigant at a former hearing have had a similar motive,
interest, and opportunity to develop the testimony. 19 The difference between the
Court's and Congress' versions largely depends upon the interpretation of the
term "predecessor in interest." A more literal reading supports a restrictive ap-
plication which reflects fairness values. A more figurative interpretation, by
comparison, supports an accuracy-dominated conception of evidentiary rules.
This Article will demonstrate that by adding the term "predecessor in inter-
est" to rule 804(b)(1), Congress sought to protect the interests of a party from
the admission of prior testimony unless that party or a formal predecessor had
enjoyed the opportunity to develop the adverse testimony in the prior proceed-
ing.20 Legislative history reveals that Congress elevated fairness values in civil
adversarial proceedings above considerations of evidentiary accuracy.2 Never-
theless, the "predecessor in interest" language has been the subject of extraordi-
nary judicial manipulation since the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence
in 1975.22 This manipulation has resulted in court-made rules for admitting
former testimony which clearly derogate from the fairness considerations em-
braced by Congress.
23
This Article will begin with a discussion of the accuracy-fairness polarity in
interpretation of rules governing the admissibility of evidence. It will then ana-
lyze the historical development of the former testimony exception, focusing on
the interplay between considerations of fairness and accuracy in the evolution of
the exception. This analysis will place in perspective Congress' recasting of the
exception to conform it to its historical underpinnings. The discussion will also
examine the modern development of the exception under the regime of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence. Finally, this Article will consider the respective roles of
18. See supra note 7 for text of rule 804(b)(1) as enacted by Congress.
19. As promulgated by the Supreme Court, rule 804(b)(1) would have provided:
(b) Hearsay Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declar-
ant is unavailable as a witness:
(1) Former Testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same
or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with the law in the
course of another proceeding at the instance of, or against, a party with an opportu-
nity to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination, with motive
and interest similar to those of the party against whom now offered.
56 F.R.D. 183, 321 (1973).
20. The Hungate Subcommittee narrowed rule 804(b)(1) to apply only when prior testimony
was introduced against the same party in the prior and subsequent proceedings. This narrowing of
the rule was done at the prompting of Representative Mayne on June 5, 1973. At Mark-up sessions
in Representative Mayne's absence, the "predecessor in interest" language was added so that the rule
would be less rigid. The limited flexibility in the "predecessor in interest" requirement is illustrated
by Representative Hungate's request for language broadening the same party requirement prior to
the subcommittee's agreement upon the "predecessor in interest" language. See Mark-up Session,
supra note 17.
21. See infra notes 91-114 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of rule
804(b)(1)).
22. See supra note 1.
23. See infra notes 115-20 & 123-43 and accompanying text (cases where "predecessor in inter-
est" language of rule 804(b)(1) has been expansively interpreted).
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the legislature and the judiciary in reifying accuracy and fairness values in evi-
dentiary rules.
24
II. AN OVERVIEW OF FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY AS NORMATIVE
PRESUMPTIONS INHERENT IN THE AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM
Principles of fairness, which entitle each litigant to an authentic opportu-
nity to present and rebut evidence, are essential to the adversarial Anglo-Ameri-
can legal systems. 25 Similarly, policies that look to accuracy as a navigational
star are significant to a system of litigation because they inspire a sense of confi-
dence and legitimacy. But positing accuracy as an objective of an individual
trial integrally involves a concept which might be labeled "historical truth,"
meaning the intelligible but logically unattainable vision of specific past events.
As this author has argued before, 26 the concept of historical truth is most useful
in evaluating a system of evidentiary rules in the aggregate of cases. In such an
analysis, the concept operates as a fictional premise that, when coupled with
intuitive notions of physical principles, behavioral patterns, and probability, pro-
vides a means of identifying the commonly used evidentiary term "probative
value." In the individual case, however, historical truth is a useless control for
testing accuracy because it creates an illusory promise of empirical testability
that is in principle unattainable.
27
Meaningless in individual cases, accuracy as an objective of our litigation
24. See infra notes 97-102 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' intent as expressed
during drafting of Rules) and infra notes 166-78 and accompanying text (demonstrating that Con-
gress has ultimate authority for Federal Rules of Evidence).
25. See supra notes 12-13 (explaining fundamental values of adversarial system).
26. Weissenberger, supra note 12, at 585-86. The textual discussion that follows is derived from
this earlier article. The illusiveness of seeking historical truth in the adjudication of disputes has been
frequently recognized:
The process of litigation is designed for the reconstruction of an event that occurred in the
recent past. And for the most part, the rules by which a trial is conducted are supposed to
enhance the accuracy of the synthetic fact. Of course, the success of this enterprise, while
not unknowable, will always be shrouded in uncertainty.
Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice in the Courtroom,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 845 (1982); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) ("[I]n a judicial proceeding in which there is a dispute about the facts of some earlier
event, the factfinder cannot acquire unassailably accurate knowledge of what happened. Instead, all
the factfinder can acquire is a belief of whatprobably happened."); J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 49-
50 (1949) ("No means, then, have yet been discovered, or are likely to be discovered, for ascertaining
whether or to what extent the belief of the trial judge about the facts of a case corresponds to the
objective facts as they actually occurred .... "); R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN AP-
PROACH TO EVIDENCE 219 n.53 (2d ed. 1982) ("Certainly the dominant trend among evidence
scholars is to justify evidence rules with respect to only one ideal, the ideal offinding truth. Unfortu-
nately, we know no sure way to do this .. ").
27. Professor Davis has dismissed accuracy on precisely the same grounds:
(1) Usually no one knows how to measure accuracy, so that talk about it is usually futile.
(2) The long-accepted assumption is that the best test of accuracy or truth is to put the
question through the trial process and treat the product as the truth. (3) American history
and tradition strongly support "fair trial" as the best test of truth, and, whatever the objec-
tive facts may be, the courts properly choose to be bound by tradition, unless and until an
adequate demonstration is made that some other test of truth is better. In the absence of
such a demonstration, the courts refrain from discussing accuracy.
2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 10:14, at 318 (2d ed. 1979).
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system only has content in the aggregate of cases, and while this aggregate accu-
racy is not a useless concept, the idea of statistical accuracy is fundamentally at
odds with the commonly held value in our system of fairness to individual liti-
gants. 28 Fairness values traditionally have been recognized in our jurisprudence
as a means of tempering a natural but primitive appetite for aggregate
accuracy.
2 9
Paramount in the Anglo-American perspective of a fair trial is the principle
that, regardless of its probity, only evidence that may effectively be rebutted in
court should be admitted.30 The general proscription against admitting hearsay
and the confrontation clause are vivid examples of our judicial system's safe-
guards of litigants' rights to counter adverse evidence. 31 While the concept of
rebuttability possesses intuitive appeal, its prominence as an evidentiary policy
may be traced to its rational, if not ineluctable connection to our societal deci-
sion to embrace an adversary system.32 To conceive of a system as adversarial is
to endorse procedural opportunities for adversarial and, presumably, adverse
presentations of proof.
28. See supra note 13 (explaining fundamental values of common-law adversarial system of
justice).
29. The Federal Rules of Evidence, for example, explicitly provide that fairness must be care-
fully considered before evidence may be admitted. See FED. R. EvID. 102 ("These rules shall be
construed to secure fairness in administration .... "); FED. R. EvID. 403 (evidence may be excluded
because of "unfair prejudice"). The policies underlying the exclusion of character evidence that
inferentially shows a person's conduct as conforming with a pattern of past behavior are based on
fairness. See Weissenberger, supra note 12, at 591-614.
30. See Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69
YALE L.J. 1149, 1192 (1960). The importance of rebuttability is particularly emphasized in criminal
cases. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
The right to rebut evidence is also present in civil actions as exemplified by the right to cross-
examine witnesses. Thus, direct testimony will be stricken if cross-examination cannot proceed be-
cause *of unavailability of the witness once examination in chief has been completed. See C. McCoR-
MICE, supra note 6, § 19; 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, §§ 1390-1394. As Wigmore explained, "[tihe
[Anglo-American] belief that no safeguard for testing the value of human statements is comparable
to that furnished by cross-examination, and the conviction that no statement (unless by special ex-
ception) should be used as testimony until it has been probed and sublimated by that test" forms the
basis for the norm that probative evidence should be rejected if it cannot be rebutted by the adverse
party. Id. § 1367, at 32.
31. The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment provides: "In criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall have the right.., to be confronted with witnesses against him .... U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. The right to cross-examine adverse witnesses "is implicit in the constitutional right of
confrontation." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973). Thus, the guarantee of confron-
tation ensures the right to rebut adverse evidence. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 78 (1980)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974); California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 176 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Hearsay evidence is generally excluded because it is deemed inherently unreliable. See C. Mc-
CORMICK, supra note 6, § 245; G. WEISSENBERGER, supra note 8, § 801.1; 5 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 6, §§ 1360-1363. Excludable evidence is by definition evidence which cannot be effectively
rebutted by its opponent. See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 26, at 595 ("[I]n some cases
where the suspicion of inaccuracy is strong, it may be clear that only cross-examination would allow
the jury to reach a reasoned judgment. If the declarant is unavailable for cross-examination, the
evidence should be excluded."); see also 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 1362 (discussing cross-exami-
nation as essential guarantee of reliability of evidence).
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the confrontation clause and the hearsay rules pro-
tect the same values. See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 393 n.5 (1986); Roberts, 448 U.S. at
63-66; Green, 399 U.S. at 155.
32. See supra notes 12-13 (discussing common-law adversarial system of justice).
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The United States Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that fairness is a
significant if not dominant policy underlying the former testimony hearsay ex-
ception.3 3 The Court explained:
[F]ormer testimony often is only a weaker substitute for live testimony.
It seldom has independent evidentiary significance of its own, but is
intended to replace live testimony. If the declarant is available and the
same information can be presented to the trier of fact in the form of
live testimony, with full cross-examination and the opportunity to view
the demeanor of the declarant, there is little justification for relying on
the weaker version. When two versions of the same evidence are avail-
able, longstanding principles of the law of hearsay, applicable as well
to Confrontation Clause analysis, favor the better evidence. But if the
declarant is unavailable, no "better" version of the evidence exists, and
the former testimony may be admitted as a substitute for live testi-
mony on the same point.
34
If fairness did not play a significant role in the admissibility of prior testi-
mony, the unavailability of the declarant would not be required because this
form of hearsay is universally regarded as supremely trustworthy and accurate
when compared with other forms of hearsay.35 Because former testimony is in
actuality some other proceeding's evidence, and possibly some other litigant's
evidence, it appears to be fundamentally fair to admit it only when better evi-
dence is unavailable.
In summary, to be consistent with principles of accuracy, the admission of
former testimony must be supported by some circumstantial indicia of reliability
or procedural safeguards militating in favor of truthfulness. To be consistent
with principles of adversarial fairness, the admission of former testimony hear-
say must safeguard the litigant's opportunity to rebut the evidence.
III. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY AS UNDERLYING
POLICIES IN ADMITTING FORMER TESTIMONY
A. Early Development of Evidentiary Rules
Described as "a piece of illogical, but by no means irrational, patch-
work,"' 36 the earliest evidentiary rules developed in response to concerns for ad-
versarial fairness. 37 It is apparent that fairness considerations were the
predominant influence because early evidentiary rules were concerned less with
the kinds of evidence a party could present and more with the identities of per-
33. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 389 (1986).
34. Id. at 394 (citations omitted).
35. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 278 (arguing that unavailability requirement should be
abandoned for former testimony because of indicia of reliability inherent with this type of evidence).
"Trustworthy" in this context applies to accuracy in the aggregate of cases. See text accompanying
note 28.
36. J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 509 (1898) (regarding all eviden-
tiary rules).
37. Id. at 271. Evidentiary rules emerged as a creation of "experience rather than logic." Id. at
267. The rules ensured that even if relevant, evidence may not be admitted if contrary to the princi-
ples that ensured a fair trial to the litigants. See id. at 272.
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sons who in fairness would be bound by such evidence.38 The common-law ad-
versarial system championed the axiom that a fair trial required each litigant to
be responsible for the development of his own evidence, and consequently fair-
ness principles of estoppel, rather than accuracy, justified the earliest receipt of
evidence. 39 Accordingly, the most primitive basis for the admission of hearsay
was the policy that a party would be estopped from objecting to evidence of
statements for which he was responsible.4° This policy supported the hearsay
exception presently known as the party admission exception. Similarly, this sem-
inal rationale evolved as a common basis for the rule that prior testimony of a
nonparty witness would only be admitted against the party who was responsible
for developing the testimony.4 1 Consequently, an examination of the historical
development of policies underlying the rules for party admissions provides a
basis for understanding the origins of the former testimony exception. Most
pertinently, it provides insight into the meaning and justification for binding a
party to the hearsay of his predecessor in interest.
1. Admissions
Under contemporary law, out-of-court statements of a party,42 when of-
fered against the party responsible for the statement, are admissible because the
declarant-party cannot object that such statements are not accompanied by the
safeguards of oath, observation of demeanor, and cross-examination. 43 Consis-
tent with this modem justification, party admissions were admitted at common
law, not because of their trustworthiness, but because of fairness. A recital in a
deed, the earliest form of party admission, was admitted as conclusive evidence
38. With the origin of the jury system in the sixteenth century, judges began to exercise increas-
ing control over the kinds of evidence that could be produced in court. 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A
HIsTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 131 (3d ed. 1927). There were concerns about presenting evidence
that might be confusing or misleading to the jury. Id. at 127; J. THAYER, supra note 36, at 266.
Additionally, evidentiary rules developed to ensure that parties would address issues defined in the
pleadings. 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra, at 127. Because the jury was comprised of individuals decid-
ing cases not from their own personal knowledge, but from facts presented in court, evidentiary rules
were developed, at least in part, to promote rational jury decisions made without emotionally-pro-
voked prejudice. See J. THAYER, supra note 36, at 266.
39. See supra notes 12-13 (discussing adversarial system's emphasis on litigants' responsibility
to develop testimony).
40. For a discussion of the common-law party/privity rules for extrajudicial admissions exem-
plifying fairness and principles of estoppel, see infra notes 47-60 and accompanying text.
41. The rule also applies to privies of parties. For a discussion of the party/privity rules for
admitting former testimony hearsay, see infra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
42. Party admissions may be words, oral or written, or conduct of the party. See C. McCoR-
MICK, supra note 6, § 262, at 776; G. WEISSENBERGER, supra note 8, § 801.2.
43. See S. SALTSBURG & K. REDDEN, THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 501 (3d.
ed. 1982) (explaining that the "best justification" for this rule is that a party cannot complain that
statements she made were not under oath nor subject to cross-examination). There has been consid-
erable debate about the proper theoretical explanation for party admissions. Wigmore espoused a
theory that admissions "satisfied" the hearsay rules. 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 1048
(Chadbourn rev. 1972). Professor Morgan argued that admissions are admitted as evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule. Morgan, The Rationale of Vicarious Admissions, 42 HARV. L. REv.
461, 461 (1929). Professor McCormick stated that admissions are a nonhearsay product of the ad-
versary system that were admitted without any need to demonstrate the trustworthiness which char-
acterizes other hearsay exceptions. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 262.
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against the person making the deed, 44 the common-law reasoning being that
justice estopped the declarant from denying or altering the statement when it
was later offered in court.45 While such admissions were initially received as
conclusive proof, they later evolved in the early jury system into evidence which
was merely probative of the facts asserted.
46
Because of fairness constraints, common-law courts did not initially extend
rules of admissions to bind successors in privity with the declarant. 47 Nine-
teenth-century courts, however, began to admit recitals in a deed against the
declarant as well as against those in privity with the declarant based upon the
rationalization that the admission "ran with the land."'48 Consequently, an
owner who succeeded to the property interest also succeeded to the obligations
and liabilities encumbering the title to the property, including written statements
by predecessors in privity. Common-law courts, however, were initially hesitant
to bind a party to the oral statements of a predecessor because it was considered
unfair to bind anyone, even a successor in interest, to a statement which he did
not utter himself.49 This reluctance to hold successors responsible for oral state-
ments is traceable to a conclusion that the earliest development of evidentiary
rules occurred within a judicial system that was predominantly responsive to
interests concerned with the protection of real property. 50 During the earliest
evolution of evidence principles, from the Middle Ages through the eighteenth
century, all oral statements in regard to transactions involving the transfer and
disposition of real property were viewed with great judicial suspicion.51 This
disfavor of oral statements ultimately manifested itself in the statute of frauds.
52
While common-law courts originally applied the principles of admissions
only to written statements of the immediate party attending transactions of real
44. 9 W. HoLDswoRTH, supra note 38, at 130; see also 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 1080
(Chadbourn Rev. 1972) (discussing recital in deed as part of early origins of party admission).
45. 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 38, at 145. "In other words, [a party declaration] is an
admission that creates so conclusive a presumption that no further evidence is admissible, even
though the evidence could prove that the real truth was contrary to the presumption." Id. at 146.
46. 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 38, at 129-30.
47. See 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 1080 (Chadbourn Rev. 1972); see also Beach v. Catlin, 4
Day 284, 295 (Conn. 1810) ("The declarations of one are never admitted to affect another who is not
present and assenting to them .... "); Duckham v. Wallis, 5 Esp. 151 (1805) ("[admitting party
declaration against non-party] would be making the declaration of a third person evidence to effect
the plaintiff's title when that person was not on the record").
48. 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 38, at 150-51.
49. See, e.g., Ford v. Gray, 91 Engl. Rep. 253 (1704) (holding that recital of release of lease in a
deed is good evidence of such lease against lessor and those who claim under him, but oral declara-
tions contrary to the interest of the estate may only be given in evidence against declarant); see also
supra note 47 (citing other common-law courts refusing to admit declarations against nonparties).
50. See 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 38, at 148.
51. See 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 1080 (Chadbouru Rev. 1972) (discussing perception held
by many common-law courts that admissions constituted hearsay); see also infra notes 62-63 and
accompanying text (discussing former testimony hearsay as especially suspect in the eyes of com-
mon-law judges).
52. See, e.g., Gibblehouse v. Strong, 3 Rawle 436, 441-44 (Pa. 1832) (opponent of admissibility
of declaration of predecessor against successor argued such oral evidence violated statute of frauds;
in this case testimony to show creation of trust not intended to impair effect of written deed so
admissible); see also 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 38, at 173-77 & 219-22 (discussing the prohibi-
tions against admitting any oral evidence in interpreting or varying content of written instrument as
inhibiting the development of oral evidence in trials).
[Vol. 67
FORMER TESTIMONY EXCEPTION
property, courts gradually accorded admissions an extended application in the
late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.5 3 By the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury, common-law courts widely accepted privity as a basis for admitting both
oral and written statements of predecessors of a party. Principally derived from
real property law, "privity" denoted four types of representative or successive
relationships: "privity in blood, as between heir and ancestor; privity in repre-
sentation, as between testator and executor... ; privity in law, as between the
commonwealth by escheat and the [intestate]; and privity in estate as between
the donor and the donee, [etc.].
' '54
In order for a successor to be bound by his predecessor's oral or written
statement, the declaration had to have been made at the time the predecessor
held the interest. Moreover, only statements pertaining to the interest itself
could be admitted.5 5 Accordingly, declarations ofjoint obligors, obligees, or ten-
ants were admissible against each other; declarations of predecessors in title
were admissible against successors; declarations of transferors and mortgagors
were admissible against transferees and mortgagees; and declarations of dece-
dents were admissible against representatives, heirs, and next of kin.56 Professor
McCormick noted that the admission of these declarations was derived from
property law: when a successor in title acquired a property interest, the succes-
sor was thought to accept the possibility that such declarations would be used
against the successor as they could have been used against the predecessor in
privity who made the statement.57 Courts following the common-law rule de-
scribed a successor as standing in the place of the predecessor,58 and found it
53. 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 38, at 146.
54. Gibblehouse, 3 Rawle at 447.
55. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 268; 4 J. WIGMORE supra note 6, § 1082 (Chadboum
Rev. 1972).
56. See, eg., Webb v. Martin, 364 F.2d 229, 232 (3d Cir. 1966) (statement of deceased admissi-
ble against administrator of estate, who was successor in interest); Estate of Fushanis v. Poulos, 85
IlI. App. 2d 114, 126, 229 N.E.2d 306, 310 (1967) (statements by decedent admissible against estate);
Kennedy v. Oleson, 251 Iowa 418, 427, 100 N.W.2d 894, 899 (1960) (defendant's grantor had admit-
ted knowledge of encroachment upon plaintiff's land; therefore, grantor's statements admissible
against defendant); Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Merchant's & Mfr.'s Paint Co., 307 Ky. 184,
189, 209 S.W.2d 828, 831 (1948) (declarations of former owner regarding boundary lines of property
admissible against successor in interest); Padgett v. Lawrence, 10 Paige Ch. 170, 180 (N.Y. 1843)
(acts and declarations of land owner admissible against one claiming title under or through land
owner); Guy v. Hall, 7 N.C. (3 Mur.) 123 (1819) (declarations of vendor of negro slave admissible
against vendee because vendor "is privy in estate, and in law, his declarations are those of the party
claiming under him"); Greiner v. Commonwealth, 334 Pa. 299, 304, 6 A.2d 67, 69 (1939) (acts and
declarations of land owner admissible against one claiming title under or through land owner);
LaFuria v. New Jersey Ins. Co., 131 Pa. Super. 413, 417, 200 A. 167, 169 (1938) (in an action by
husband and wife on fire insurance policy, statement by husband admissible against wife, who owned
property with husband as tenants by entireties); see also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 268 (dis-
cussing declarations by joint tenants and predecessors in interest); 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
supra note 6, 801(d)(2)(D)[01], at 801-229 (discussing common-law rule).
57. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 268; see 1 S. GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 189, at 316 (16th ed. 1899) ("The ground upon which admissions bind those in privity
with the party making them is, that they are identified in interest; and, of course, the rule extends no
farther than this identity.").
58. See, e.g., Padgett v. Lawrence, 10 Paige Ch. 170, 180 (N.Y. 1843) (declarations of those in
possession of real estate may be used against those who subsequently derive title under declarant);
Guy v. Hall, 7 N.C. (3 Mur.) 123, 124 (1819) ("his subsequent purchaser stands in his situation").
Wigmore explains that:
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fair to use the privity relationship as a basis for admitting the predecessor's state-
ments.5 9 For example, in explaining the rationale for the privity rule for party
admissions, a court reasoned that the same common-law estoppel principles sup-
ported both res judicata and the party admission exception.6° While the analogy
between this evidentiary rule and issue or judgment preclusion is strained be-
cause of notable differences in the two concepts, the shared estoppel foundation
is apparent.
2. Former Testimony Hearsay Exception
The history of the former testimony hearsay exception closely parallels the
evolution of party admissions, because the development of both exceptions is
rooted in a judicial system designed to protect real property interests. As the
hearsay rule and its exceptions unfolded during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, 6 1 numerous requirements for the application of party admissions and
for prior testimony hearsay became intertwined. These included the requirement
that the declarant be unavailable before his out-of-court statements would be
admitted. 62 Unavailability of the declarant ultimately ceased to be a requirement
for party admissions, but former testimony hearsay, as a less desirable form of
evidence than in-court testimony, could only be admitted when the declarant
could be shown to be unavailable.
63
The underlying fairness policy for admitting prior testimony was expressed
in an early common-law rule which required absolute identity of the parties and
issues in the former and the instant litigation. 4 One English court explained the
This doctrine proceeds upon the idea that the present claimant stands in the place of the
person from whom his title is derived; has taken it "cum onere"; and as the predecessor
might have taken a qualified right, or sold, charged, restricted, or modified an absolute
right, and as he might furnish all the necessary evidence to show its state in his own hands,
the law will not allow third persons to be deprived of that evidence by any act of transfer-
ring the right to another.
4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 1080, at 191 (Chadbourn Rev. 1972) (quoting I COWEN & HILL,
NOTES To PHILLIPS ON EVIDENCE No. 481, at 644 (1843)).
59. See supra note 56 (court decisions accepting admissions into evidence because of privity
relationship). For further discussion of the common-law rule regarding declarations by privies, see
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 268; 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 6,
801(d)(2)(D)[01], at 801-227; 4 . WIGMORE, supra note 6, §§ 1080-1087 (Chadbourn Rev. 1972).
60. Gibblehouse v. Strong, 3 Rawle 436, 448 (Pa. 1832). The court first quoted Starkie's Trea-
tise in evidence in support of the principle of res judicata, then went on to state that upon this same
principle
executors and administrators, as also devisees, legatees, heirs, and next of kin are all bound
by the promises, whether written or verbal, of their respective testators... and the declara-
tions and admissions of such testators and intestates are uniformly received in evidence
against their devisees, legatees, heirs, and next of kin, so as to affect the estates which have
passed to them.
Id.
61. See 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 38, at 127; 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 43, § 1080.
62. See generally 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 1080 (Chadbourn Rev. 1972) (discussing ten-
dency of common-law courts to interpret any out-of-court statement as suspect hearsay with no
differentiation between party admissions and other hearsay exceptions).
63. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 253 (discussion of unavailability); 4 J. WEINSTEIN &
M. BERGER, supra note 6, % 804(a)[01] (same); G. WEISSENBERGER, supra note 8, §§ 804.2-.8
(briefly discussing same).
64. See 5 3. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 1386.
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reason for delimiting the admissibility of former testimony as follows:
The rule of the common law is, that no evidence shall be admitted but
what is or might be under the examination of both parties; and it is
agreeable also to common sense, that what is imperfect, and, if I may
so say, but half an examination shall not be used in the same way as if
it were complete.
65
Under the original common-law rule,66 both parties to the former and sub-
sequent suits were required to be the same, such that if the former testimony
could not be received against one party, that party could not benefit by offering
it against her adversary. 67 The early inflexible rule became tempered in much
the same fashion as the party admission exception.68 It was later refined to pro-
vide that former testimony could be admitted in a subsequent trial when the
party against whom the former testimony was offered was the same party who
had developed the original testimony. 69 In essence, it appeared fair to estop
such a party from objecting to evidence developed by that party, and the abso-
lute identity and mutuality of parties requirement was abandoned.
Additionally, consistent with the development of the party admission ex-
ception, the former testimony exception evolved to qualify the testimony devel-
oped by a predecessor of a party when such predecessor was a litigant in the
prior suit. This doctrine was based on concepts of fairness and estoppel bor-
rowed from the party admissions exception. Forcing a party to accept another
litigant's cross-examination seemed unfair7" unless there was only a nominal
65. Cazenove v. Vaughn, 105 Eng. Rep. 2, 3 (1813).
66. The same rules were accepted in the United States in the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 278 (outlining the restrictive same party/same issue rules
for admitting prior testimony); G. WEISSENBERGER, supra note 8, § 804.14 (briefly discussing same).
67. G. WEISSENBERGER, supra note 8, § 804.14; see also 4 J. WEmNSTMN & M. BERGER, supra
note 6, 804(b)(1)[04] (discussing mutuality requirements).
68. See supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of the parallel rule
that party declarations may be admitted against persons in privity with declarant).
69. See, eg., Rumford Chem. Works v. Hygienic Chem. Co., 215 U.S. 156, 159-60 (1909);
Tappan v. Beardsley, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 427, 436 (1870); Rutherford v. Geddes, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
220, 224 (1866); Metropolitan St. Ry. v. Gumby, 99 F. 192, 198-99 (2d Cir. 1900); S.W. Anderson
Co. v. Glenn, 43 F. Supp. 334, 338 (W.D. Ky. 1942); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 1
F.R.D. 48, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1938); All v. All, 250 F. 120, 133 (E.D.S.C. 1918); London Guar. & Acci-
dent Co. v. American Cereal Co., 251 Ill. 123, 131, 95 N.E. 1064,1067 (1911); Oliver v. Louisville &
N.R.R., 17 Ky. L. Rptr. 840, 841, 32 S.W. 759, 759 (1895).
70. See Lane v. Brainerd, 30 Conn. 565, 579 (1862). The Lane court reasoned:
As that was a trial between different parties, having different rights, and with whom the
plaintiff had no privity, and as he had no opportunity to examine or cross-examine the
witnesses, it would be contrary to the first principles of justice to bind or in any way affect
his interests by the evidence given on that occasion, however identical the questions or
some of them may have been with the questions which arise in this case.
Id. The rule, so fundamental that courts often deemed elucidation unnecessary, was expressed by
the United States Supreme Court as follows:
The depositions relied on by the appellant were properly ruled out, for the reason that
they were taken without notice to defendants, in another suit to which defendants were not
parties, and in which they had no right or opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. Nor
were the defendants in any manner privies to either party in the former suit, in which the
depositions had been taken. This alone, it is well settled, is a sufficient reason for their
exclusion.
Rutherford v. Geddes, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 220, 224 (1866).
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change in parties, as when the parties were connected by privity, meaning they
were privies in blood, property, or law, and held the same rights and protected
the same interests. 71 It did not appear unfair to hold a party responsible for a
previous litigant's examination or cross-examination of a witness when the party
against whom the prior testimony was offered had succeeded to the position of
the predecessor litigant conducting the examination or cross-examination in the
prior action. 72 Consequently, the rule requiring privity between a predecessor in
prior litigation and the party against whom the prior testimony is offered is
traceable to the party admissions exception and its connection to principles of
real property law.
73
It is not surprising that common-law courts would look to privity as an
exception to the rule that prior testimony could only be admitted against the
party who had the opportunity to develop the original testimony. Through such
a legal relationship the successor stood in the place of the predecessor and suc-
ceeded to all of the benefits and liabilities of that interest, including prior claims
and attendant trial conduct concerning the interest. 74 Consequently, courts per-
mitted not only the admission of the predecessor's own statements against the
subsequent privy (an admission of a party's predecessor), but also the admission
of testimony developed in a predecessor's litigation that pertained to the shared
or transferred interest. 75 In contrast, the testimony developed by a stranger not
standing in privity with the party in the subsequent trial would not qualify; to
admit such evidence would bind a person who was not accountable for the devel-
opment of the prior testimony and, therefore, would be "against natural
71. See Metropolitan St. Ry. v. Gumby, 99 F. 192, 198 (2d Cir. 1900) (discussing privity
exception).
72. See Mclnturff v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 248 Ill. 92, 95-98, 93 N.E. 369, 370-71 (1910)
(discussing fairness of admitting former testimony when nominal change in parties).
73. Some common-law courts, drawing from normative presumptions of adversarial fairness,
equated the rules for admitting prior testimony evidence with the rules for res judicata and collateral
estoppel. See Metropolitan St Ry., 99 F. at 195; Charles H. Demarest, Inc. v. United States, 174 F.
Supp. 380, 385-87 (Cust. Ct. 1959); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 43 (1982)
("A judgment in an action that determines interests in real or personal property... [hias preclusive
effects upon a person who succeeds to the interest of a party to the same extent as upon the party
himself."). The rules for claim preclusion and issue preclusion are based on the principle that the
party must have had a fair opportunity to try the issues at bar before he or his privies can be bound
by the resulting judgments. See Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables Parties, 50 IOwA L.
REv. 27, 45 (1964) (discussing the relationship between party and successor as close enough to
assure successor had fair trial of interests). Thus, one court reasoned, the same fairness constraints
that warrant the party/privity requirement for the preclusion of res judicata should also require that
prior testimony evidence that would contribute to a judgment should also be admitted exclusively
against the party who has had the opportunity to develop the testimony or his privies. Demarest,
174 F. Supp. at 389. "If [a party is not bound by res judicata,] it would seem to be strange if a party
were, nevertheless, bound by the record (in the making of which neither he nor his privies partici-
pated) which led to the former adjudication." Id. See generally G. WEISSENERGER, supra note 8,
§ 804.12 (discussing estoppel as underlying policy of former testimony exception). This analogy be-
tween prior testimony and res judicata and promissory estoppel has been criticized. See 5 J. Wic-
MORE, supra note 6, § 1388, at 118-19; see also supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussion of
analogy between res judicata and party admissions).
74. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (discussion of privity as denoting succession
to benefits and liabilities of property interest in context of admissions).
75. See Bath v. Bathersea, 87 Eng. Rep. 487 (1794) (deposition may be read in subsequent trial
against party "sheltering himself under the other's title"); see also Guy v. Hall, 7 N.C. (3 Mur.) 123,




Fairness to the individual litigant was fundamental to the common-law ad-
versarial system. This value was repeatedly expressed through the party/privity
requirements of procedural and evidentiary rules: imposing evidence on a party,
when that evidence is not attributable to the party or his predecessor in privity,
was commonly perceived to be unfair.
B. Recent Developments in Evidentiary Rules: The Trend Toward an
Emphasis on Accuracy
Throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the party/privity
rules of the party admission exception and the former testimony exception drew
increasing criticism as courts and commentators began to emphasize accuracy as
the ultimate goal of evidentiary rules. In the context of party admissions, Pro-
fessor Morgan argued against the common-law rule because he thought that the
privity relationship offered no guaranty of trustworthiness. 77 Professor Falknor,
in contrast, found the common-law rule acceptable because of the analogous
principles of representation in agency law. He argued that an agent's declara-
tions are admissible against the principal simply because of the relationship be-
tween them, not because the declarations are more reliable than other hearsay;
similarly, the declarations of predecessors in privity are admissible against their
successors because of the relationship that manifests the shared interest. 78 Con-
cern for trustworthiness, as expressed by Professor Morgan, ultimately prevailed
over the emphasis on fairness, and none of the recent evidence codifications (the
Model Code of Evidence, the Uniform Rules of Evidence, or the Federal Rules
of Evidence) accept privity alone as a basis for admitting out-of-court statements
of predecessors of parties.
7 9
Similarly, the restrictive rule that prior testimony could only be admitted
against the party who developed the testimony or his successor in privity was
expanded because courts began to emphasize accuracy over fairness. The idea
that binding a party to a stranger's cross-examination is unfair became
subordinated to the need for accurate evidence.8 0 The rule became liberalized
76. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 1386 (quoting Trials at Nisi Prius 239 (1767) (Buller, J.) ("it
is against natural justice that a man should be concluded by proofs in a cause to which he was not a
party")).
77. Morgan, supra note 43; Morgan, Admissions, 12 WAsH. L. REv. 181 (1937). Indeed, he
was right, but the privity doctrine was never designed to ensure fairness. Even under modem princi-
ples, the party admission exception is justified by estoppel notions and not accuracy. See FED. R.
EvID. 801(d)(2)(A) advisory committee's note.
78. Falknor, Hearsay, 1969 LAw & Soc. ORD. 591, 603-04.
79. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 268; see also 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra
note 6, 801(d)(2)(D)[01], at 801-227 (further discussion of change in emphasis from fairness to
trustworthiness). The Federal Rules of Evidence have retained the rule that admissions of an agent
are admissible against the principal when the declarations relate to the agent's scope of employment.
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D). The explanation for this rule is that even without express authoriza-
tion, the agent "speaks for" the principal when in the capacity of agent and his statements thus are
trustworthy. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 267; 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 1078
(Chadboum Rev. 1972).
80. See Falknor, supra note 11, at 655. Dean Falknor explains that if a prior cross-examination
was "inept or inadequate," or was not performed at all, the present opponent's objection to admis-
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primarily as a result of Dean Wigmore's influence. Dean Wigmore added a par-
agraph to the pertinent section of the 1899 edition of Greenleaf's treatise on
evidence, proposing that when present and former parties are "so privy in inter-
est" that they have the same motive for cross-examination, then the present op-
ponent of former testimony has had a fair opportunity-at least fictionally-to
cross-examine the witness.81 He reiterated this theory in his own treatise, again
emphasizing that identity of interest between the present and prior opponents of
the testimony ensured the accuracy of the testimony and the fairness of its ad-
mission.8 2 As a result of Wigmore's influence, courts began to accept a theory
very similar to that of Morgan regarding party admissions, that is, "no magic" is
reposed in a connection by blood, property, or law.83 Courts and commentators
reasoned that because the primary issue in achieving accuracy is the similarity of
sion of the prior testimony would be "difficult to answer," that is "if the emphasis is upon the
adversary character of a common law trial and the rules of evidence are envisaged as 'rules of fair
play'...." Id. He adds that if the emphasis is instead upon "achieving a just and correct result,"
and if the purpose of the evidentiary rules is to ensure accuracy, then the emphasis on identity of
interest could be reasonable. Id.
The courts that have considered the fairness of admitting former testimony have stressed that
the attorney who cross-examined the witness in the prior trial may not have used the approach
preferred by the present opponent nor have been as thorough as the present opponent would like.
See, e.g., Charles H. Demarest, Inc. v. United States, 174 F. Supp. 380, 389 (Cust. Ct. 1959). Most
courts recently have emphasized the need for identity of interest, along with the more fundamental
idea that trials should, above all, be accurate. See, eg., Mid-City Bank & Trust Co. v. Reading Co.,
3 F.R.D. 320, 322 (D.N.J. 1944) ("[t]he rules of evidence were designed to obtain the truth"); Bart-
lett v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 349 Mo. 13, 16, 160 S.W.2d 740, 742 (1942) ("[t]he ultimate
purpose of any trial... is the ascertainment of truth-the accurate determination of the actual facts
in the controversy").
81. 1 S. GREENLEAF, supra note 57, § 163a, at 278-79. Wigmore explains:
As to the parties, all that is essential is that the present opponent should have had a
fair opportunity of cross-examination; consequently, a change of parties which does not
effect such a loss does not prevent the use of the testimony,-as, for example, a change by
which one of the opponents is omitted or by which a merely nominal party is added; and
the principle also admits the testimony where the parties, though not the same, are so privy
in interest-as, where one was an executor or perhaps a grantor-that the same motive and
need for cross-examination existed.
Id. Some courts were hesitant to interpret Wigmore's rule broadly. See, eg., Mclnturff v. Insurance
Co. of N. Am., 248 IlL. 92, 95-96, 93 N.E. 269, 270 (1910) (stating that the majority of courts
interpret Wigmore's paragraph in the Greenleaf treatise to mean that "a mere nominal change of
parties is of no consequence provided the parties in the second action are so privy in interest with
those on the former trial that the same motive and need for cross-examination existed").
82. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 1388, at 111. Wigmore acknowledges that it "seems fair" to
insist that a person be satisfied with the cross-examination of testimony offered against her. He notes
that a person must accept a prior cross-examination when the person is a privy in interest with the
prior party, because their interests are the same. Wigmore concludes that "Ithe principle, then, is
that where the interest of the person was calculated to induce equally as thorough a testing by cross-
examination, then the present opponent has had adequate protection for the same end." Id.
83. See, e.g., Mid-City Bank & Trust Co. v. Reading Co., 3 F.R.D. 320, 322-23 (D.N.J. 1944).
The Mid-City court reasoned:
The similarity of the interest of each of the parties is closely associated with the question as
to whether the issues involved in each of the two actions are identical. But conceivably it is
not necessary that mutual or successive relationships, such as privity in law, privity in
blood, or privity in estate, exist in order that there may be an identity of interest satisfying
the requirement of the rules of evidence as to the right of cross-examination by an adverse
party.
Id. at 322; see also Bartlett v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 349 Mo. 13, 20, 160 S.W.2d 740, 745




interests which motivates examination or cross-examination, former testimony
should be admissible not only against the original party who developed the testi-
mony and his successors in privity, but against anyone with sufficiently similar
interests. 84 Once a commentator with the stature of Dean Wigmore redirected
the analysis of the prior testimony exception, it was inevitable that it would
become more liberalized.85
If the issue is framed to ask whether any significant accuracy is sacrificed by
abandoning the absolute mutuality and privity requirements, the search for
more helpful and useful evidence would naturally encourage the elimination of
these strictures. Without question, the strictures add little or nothing to ensur-
ing accuracy. But mutuality and privity were requirements never designed to
ensure accuracy.8 6 Rather, these requirements were imposed because it was rec-
ognized that former testimony possesses a potency and character lacking in
other forms of admissible hearsay. As the Supreme Court has recently reaf-
firmed, prior testimony is a form of hearsay that seldom has independent eviden-
tiary significance; its purpose is to replace live testimony when such testimony is
unavailable.8 7 Operating as a substitute for live testimony, prior testimony has
the virtual force of an in-court witness, and thus its receipt is justifiably re-
strained when unfairness would result.
IV. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF RULE 804(B)(1)
At the time the Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted, the former testi-
mony hearsay exception no longer required absolute mutuality,88 requiring in-
stead only that the parties and interests in the former and the present action be
substantially the same.8 9 The Supreme Court's advisory committee was cogni-
84. The Supreme Court of Missouri was one of the first courts to adopt Wigmore's views.
Bartlett, 349 Mo. at 17, 160 S.W.2d at 743. In Bartlett, the husband of a woman injured in a bus
accident brought an action for loss of her services; the wife later brought an action for her injuries.
Id. at 15-16, 160 S.W.2d at 742. Testimony from the first trial was admitted in the second trial,
despite the court's acknowledgement that there could have been differences in the cross-examination
in the two cases, because the need for the testimony outweighed the unfairness of admitting the
testimony against the second litigant. Id. at 17-18, 160 S.W.2d at 743-44. The court concluded that
although the husband and wife were not privies, their interests were the same in their respective
actions. Id. at 20-21, 160 S.W.2d at 745.
Numerous other courts followed this line of reasoning. See, ag., Insul-Wool Insulation Corp. v.
Home Insulation, Inc., 176 F.2d 502, 503-04 (10th Cir. 1949); First Nat'l Bank in Greenwich v.
National Airlines, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 46, 51-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Rivera v. American Export Lines, 13
F.R.D. 27, 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Mid-City Bank & Trust Co. v. Reading Co., 3 F.R.D. 320, 322-23
(D.N.J. 1944).
85. Eg., Mid-City Bank & Trust Co. v. Reading Co., 3 F.R.D. 320, 322-23 (D.N.J. 1944); see
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 256, at 765; 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 1388.
86. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text (common-law courts very reluctant to admit
hearsay; strict rules developed to ensure litigants' opportunities to rebut adverse testimony). For a
discussion of rebuttability of evidence as a foundation of the adversarial system, see supra notes 30-
32 and accompanying text.
87. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986). For a discussion of this case, see supra
notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussion of mutuality requirement for admit-
ting prior testimony).
89. See, eg., Tug Raven v. Trexler, 419 F.2d 536, 543 (4th Cir.) (testimony given at Coast
Guard proceeding admissible in later civil action where interests of prior and present parties "sub-
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zant of the extant federal common-law status of the exception and, in essence,
embraced the thinking of courts applying the relaxed formulation of the excep-
tion. 90 The version of the former testimony exception promulgated by the
Supreme Court's advisory committee, however, was not adopted by Congress.
Instead, Congress restructured the exception without a complete awareness and
appreciation of its historical development, relying on the same intuitive assump-
tions which shaped the early development of the exception. Congress felt that
unfairness would result from imposing former testimony on a party who was not
responsible for its development. In such a situation a party might be compelled
to face hearsay of an extraordinary character that it could not effectively rebut
due to its unique potency. An examination of the legislative history of rule
804(b)(1) facilitates a proper interpretation of the exception.
A. Interpreting the Committee Reports
The version of rule 804(b)(1) that was promulgated by the United States
Supreme Court would have allowed the admission of former testimony into evi-
dence if the party against whom it was offered, or a person "with motive and
interest similar," had the opportunity to develop the testimony.9 1 This version
would have permitted the admission of prior testimony without requiring privity
between the litigant in the prior proceeding and the party in the subsequent
proceeding. 92 The Supreme Court's version of the Rules, which reflected the
views of the majority of cases and commentators, 93 was sent to Congress on
February 5, 1973, under the Rules Enabling Act and would have become effec-
tive on July 1, 1973.94 A bill requiring affirmative congressional approval of the
Rules, however, halted the process.95
stantially the same"), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938 (1969); Baldwin-Montrose Chem. Co. v. Rothberg,
37 F.R.D. 354, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (court may order use of depositions and interrogatories taken in
earlier action when "there are common questions of law or fact and a substantial identity of issue");
First Nat'l Bank in Greenwich v. National Airlines, 22 F.R.D. 46, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (former
testimony admissible against present opponent when prior opponent had "same interest and motive
in" cross-examination); Travelers Fire Ins. Co. v. Wright, 322 P.2d 417, 420-21 (Okla. 1958) (testi-
mony of witnesses in prior criminal case in which one partner was defendant was admissible in later
civil action brought by both partners); see also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, at 763-67 (explaining
history of "identity of parties" requirement of former testimony exception); 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, supra note 6, % 804(b)(1)[04], at 804-85 (same); Annotation, 70 A.L.R.2D 494 (1960) (ist-
ing decisions on admissibility of former testimony in civil cases).
90. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) advisory committee's note.
91. See supra note 19 for Supreme Court's version of rule 804(b)(1).
92. The advisory committee's note explains that the common law limited the admissibility of
former testimony to those cases with a substantial identity of issues and parties between the earlier
and later trials. Strict identity, or privity, was required between the party against whom the testi-
mony was being offered and the party who had an opportunity to develop the testimony. The
Supreme Court's version of the rule departed from this requirement "to the extent of allowing substi-
tution of one with the right and opportunity to develop the testimony with similar motive and inter-
est." FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) advisory committee's note.
93. See supra notes 82-89 and accompanying text (explaining the majority rule at the time the
Federal Rules of Evidence were proposed).
94. Under the Rules Enabling Act, the Federal Rules of Evidence would have become effective
90 days after the session began. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
95. Act of March 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (87
Stat.) 11 (approved March 30, 1973).
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During the process of congressional review of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, the Special Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, chaired by
Representative William Hungate, modified rule 804(b)(1). 96 The Committee's
report states:
Rule 804(b)(1) as submitted by the Court allowed prior testimony
of an unavailable witness to be admissible if the party against whom it
is offered or a person "with motive and interest similar" to his had an
opportunity to examine the witness. The Committee considered that it
is generally unfair to impose upon the party against whom the hearsay
evidence is being offered responsibility for the manner in which the
witness was previously handled by another party. The sole exception
to this, in the Committee's view, is where a party's predecessor in in-
terest in a civil action or proceeding had an opportunity and similar
motive to examine the witness. The Committee amended the Rule to
reflect these policy determinations.
97
Because of concerns about fairness, the House Committee designated one
very narrow circumstance in which former testimony of a non-party could be
admitted against that party in a civil case. This record of the Subcommittee
mark-up sessions9" reflects an unambiguous intent to require a formal relation-
ship between the predecessor developing the testimony at the former hearing
and the successor-party against whom the hearsay would be offered.99 While it
96. The House Committee on the Judiciary added the language in italics and omitted the brack-
eted portion of the rule:
(1) Former Testimony.-Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same
or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of
the same or another proceeding, [at the instance of or against a party with an opportunity
to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination, with motive and interest
similar to those of the party against whom now offered.] if the party against whom the
testimony is now offered, or in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an
opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect
examination.
See 56 F.R.D. 183, 321 (1973); Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1942 (1975).
97. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1975), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 7075, 7088.
98. The mark-up sessions of the Subcommittee were transcribed and published for the first time
in a previous article by this author. See Weissenberger, supra note 17, at 353-65.
99. The House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice actually altered the language of the rule
804(b)(1) from the Supreme Court version to the current version. The Subcommittee discussed and
amended this rule during mark-up sessions held in 1973. For a transcription of the tape recordings
of the pertinent portions of the mark-up sessions, see Weissenberger, supra note 17, at 353-65. The
Subcommittee's discussions of rule 804(b)(1) reveal its intent to limit the use of former testimony,
based on fairness considerations. These excerpts exemplify this concern:
Rep. Hungate: Now, 804(b)(1).
Counsel: This again is just a draft to implement something that the subcommittee decided
in principle and then asked us to come up with an appropriate draft.
[The preceding session contained discussions about narrowing Rule 804(b)(1), especially in
criminal cases; members' concerns about fairness to civil litigants also were expressed.]
Counsel: Yes, the original rule said the parties to a prior hearing or deposition needed only
to have "motive and interest similar to" the party against whom it was offered. Now this
would say "if the party against whom it is now offered had an opportunity to develop the
testimony by direct, cross or redirect." My recollection of Mr. Mayne's suggestion was
that this might have been some nickel and dime lawsuit that they really did not pay much
attention to when this issue was presented, and it just passed on. Whereas, now it is a key
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is not clear whether the Subcommittee intended the relationship to be the strict
equivalent of common-law privity, the Subcommittee manifestly contemplated a
formal succession of interests. The mark-up session indicates an unmistakable
intent to disqualify testimony developed by litigants who are merely affiliated or
related to the party against whom the hearsay would be offered. Some formal,
legal nexus (such as between a decedent and his personal representative) was
expressly contemplated. The legal relationship or succession expressly contem-
plated demonstrates that the intended interpretation of "predecessor in interest"
was not figurative or fictional, but rather formalistic and literal. This formalistic
nexus is virtually identical to, if not absolutely the equivalent of, common-law
privity. The House Subcommittee version was adopted by the House and ulti-
mately passed by the Senate.10°
The interpretation of rule 804(b)(1) becomes necessarily confused when the
Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary is considered in light of the
House Report. The Senate Report states that the committee found little differ-
ence between the Supreme Court and the House versions of the rule, and there-
fore the Senate deferred to the House and accepted its version of rule
issue in a very important suit and these persons now concerned did not even have a chance
in the other suit. I thought that was a pretty good argument.
Counsel: If you wanted we could say, "If the party, or a successor," or whatever the
language is-representative, is that what...
Rep. Mann: "Successor" would probably include substitution.
Counsel: Or "If, if the party or a successor in interest provided in Rule 32," etc.
Rep. Hungate: I do not think I would go back to that.
Counsel: What if you just said, "If the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or
his predecessor in interest," something like that, "had an opportunity to develop .... " Is
that the point that you had in mind?
(More discussion on successor/predecessor wording ensued.]
Rep. Mann: Well, I feel that the inclusion of the words, "a predecessor in interest," is
going to cover ninety-eight percent of the cases... because I think they will turn out to be
predecessors in interest. It is difficult to conceive of a representative also not being a prede-
cessor in interest if it is the same party, even in a deceased situation. I would say that was a
predecessor in interest.
[Exchange between members and counsel clarifying that predecessor in interest would not
apply to criminal cases.]
Counsel: [reading draft] "[I]f the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or a
predecessor in interest, had an opportunity to develop.. ." and so on.
Rep. Mann: Well, the real question then is, does the "predecessor in interest" encompass
collateral parties, codefendants, coconspirators, which gets us back to motive and interest
similar to those of the parties in the original suit.
Counsel: Well it is not intended to and you can put that in your Note.
[The committee concluded by accepting the predecessor in interest language.]
Mark-up Session No. 14-2, Federal Rules of Evidence, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, House of
Representatives, June 12, 1973, transcribed in Weissenberger, supra note 17, at 357-65.
During a July 1984 telephone interview with Thomas Hutchinson, counsel for the House Sub-
committee on Criminal Justice since 1973, Mr. Hutchinson stated that the draft of the rule and
accompanying report on rule 804(b)(1) was comprised of the comments of members during the
mark-up sessions. Mr. Hutchinson added that the rule's drafts and accompanying reports were
approved by Chairman Hungate to ensure that they accurately reflected the view expressed during
the mark-up sessions before release in committee print. For a discussion of the value of these tran-
scripts as a source of legislative history, see infra note 109 and accompanying text.
100. 4 J. WEINSTIN & M. BERGER, supra note 6, at 804-8 to -9.
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804(b)(1). 10 1 The committee reports generate inevitable interpretation problems
because on a quick reading the Senate Report seems to minimize a significant
alteration that, according to the House Report, was essential for ensuring fair-
ness to the party against whom the former testimony would be offered. This
policy of adversarial fairness was unambiguously reflected in the deliberations of
the House Subcommittee during the process of redrafting rule 804(b)(1). Sub-
committee members recognized the import of the advisory committee's version,
but consciously elected to circumscribe the use of prior testimony in civil cases,
believing that the Supreme Court's version of the rule did not adequately safe-
guard fairness to litigants.10 2 Additionally, the Senate Report makes no refer-
ence to statements submitted by numerous commentators during the Senate
Judiciary Committee's hearings on the Federal Rules of Evidence which high-
lighted the significant divergence between the House and Supreme Court ver-
sions of rule 804(b)(1). 10 3 Consequently, the Senate Report is incongruous with
the fact that there was notice of the significance of the House alterations of rule
804(b)(1).
Rule 804(b)(1) is further subject to distortion because the House left the
term "predecessor in interest" undefined. As a result, courts have been inconsis-
tent in their interpretations of this language-at times to the point of ignoring
it.104 Initial interpretations of the language by commentators suggested that the
"predecessor in interest" language denotes the "traditional rule," which at com-
mon law meant privity.10 5 As Professor Lilly explains:
101. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 7051, 7074. The report states that "[a]lthough the committee recognizes considera-
ble merit to the rule submitted by the Supreme Court, a position which has been advocated by many
scholars and judges, we have concluded that the difference between the two versions is not great and
we accept the House amendment." Id.
102. For an illustration of the specific fairness concerns of the drafters of rule 804(b)(1) as ex-
pressed during committee mark-up sessions, see Weissenberger, supra note 17, at 353-65.
103. See Federal Rules of Evidence: Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 53, 69-70 (1974), reprinted in 4 J. BAILEY & 0. TRELLIS, THE RULES OF
EVIDENCE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND RELATED DOCUMENTS (1980) (statement submitted by
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and the Advisory Committee on Rules of
Evidence of the Judicial Council of the United States); id. at 127, 174-75 (critique submitted by H.
Keatinger and J. Blanchard); id. at 215, 231-32 (article submitted with statement by F. Rothstein).
104. See infra notes 115-24 and accompanying text (cases interpreting predecessor in interest
language of rule 804(b)(1)).
105. See 11 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 804.04[02] (2d. ed. 1988); 4 J. WEIN-
STEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 6, t 804(b)(1)[04], at 804-89. Judge Weinstein points out, however,
that cases decided since the enactment of rule 804(b)(1) tend to favor an expansive interpretation of
this rule. Id. at 804-89 to -91. Professor McCormick had initially acknowledged that the "predeces-
sor in interest" language reinstated the common-law privity requirement. Wilton & Campbell, The
Admissibility of Prior Testimony of Out-of-Court Experts, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 111, 124 n.62 (quot-
ing C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 256, at 77 (Supp. 1978)). Since the Wilton &
Campbell article was written, however, the McCormick treatise has changed its position, now stating
that Congress did not intend to require privity in civil application of rule 804(b)(1), apparently
approving the broad judicial interpretation of the "predecessor in interest" language from Lloyd. Id.
at 124. The McCormick treatise provides:
Had it been intended to reinstate the outmoded concept of privity as developed at the
common law, a statement to that effect could easily have been included, with unmistake-
able meaning, but no such statement was made. The draftsmen at this point seemingly
were searching for a suitable phrase to describe an acceptable substitute examiner, and they
settled upon "predecessor in interest." In reality, of course, the key is that the prior exam-
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Although the phrase "predecessor in interest" (which the courts fre-
quently use interchangeably with the phrase "persons in privity") has
an exasperating inexactness about it, the expression generally refers to
the predecessor from whom the present party received the right, title,
interest or obligation that is at issue in the current litigation. For ex-
ample, a decedent is a predecessor in interest to ("in privity with")
both his personal representative and those, such as heirs and legatees,
who take from him; so, too, is a grantor of property a predecessor to
his grantee, as is a principal to his surety.
10 6
Professor Lilly's interpretation of "predecessor in interest" is consistent with the
House committee's overriding policy emphasis on fairness in modifying the advi-
sory committee's version of rule 804(b)(1), which contained no such limitation.
The common-law requirement of privity for the admission of former testimony
was identified in the legislative history as "a further assurance of fairness."' 0 7
Moreover, one commentator advised the Senate Judiciary Committee that the
House version's "predecessor in interest" language signified a return to the com-
mon-law privity requirement.' 03 Accordingly, interpreting the "predecessor in
interest" language as requiring a formalistic legal nexus between the former
party and the instant party is an appropriate and compelling mandate to a
court's interpretation of rule 804(b)(1), considering the rule's legislative history
and, most particularly, the House Committee Report.
B. The Value of the Committee Reports
Courts have found that committee reports are the "most reliable indicia of
congressional intent."' 0 9 Additionally, comments by committee members con-
iner, however described, had "similar motive." As the court said in the leading, and virtu-
ally only, case construing the rule, "The previous party having like motive to develop the
same testimony about the same material facts, is, in the final analysis, a predecessor in
interest to the present party."
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 256, at 766-67 (footnotes omitted).
106. Lilly, supra note 11, at 288 (footnotes omitted). For additional discussion of "predecessor
in interest" denoting privity at common law, see supra notes 56-59 & 72-75 and accompanying text
(in contexts of party admissions and former testimony hearsay). See also supra note 99 (transcript of
mark-up session, asserting that "predecessor in interest" should denote legal representation, such as
personal representative of a deceased).
107. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) advisory committee's note.
108. See 4 J. BAILEY & 0. TRELLIS, supra note 103, at 69-70.
The essential difference between the two versions is the House's substitution of the
common law's "same party" or "predecessor in interest" test in place of the more simple
"with motive and interest similar to those of the party against whom offered" test provided
[by the Supreme Court].
The position of the House represents a step backward and is needlessly ... restrictive.
It must be remembered... that the choice is not whether to insist upon production of the
witness but rather whether anything at all is obtainable from that source ....
The rule should be reinstated in the form submitted by the court.
Id.
109. See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 474 (1921); Mills v. United States,
713 F.2d 1249, 1252 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing United States v. Curtis-Nevada Mines, Inc., 611 F.2d
1277 (9th Cir. 1980); Housing Auth. of Omaha v. United States Hous. Auth., 468 F.2d 1 (8th Cir.
1972), cerL denied, 410 U.S. 927 (1973)), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1069 (1984); see also 2A N. SINGER,




cerning the legislation in question are valuable in interpreting the enactment. 110
While the Senate in its report suggested that the House's change of the rule was
not "great," the Senate acknowledged that a change was indeed made.'1 ' Re-
gardless of whether the change was foreseeably great or minimal, alteration was
certainly effected, and the rule as amended by the House was accepted by both
chambers of Congress.
Courts have consistently held that it is reasonable to assume that the legis-
lature has adopted the intent of a committee in regard to those parts of an en-
acted bill which were introduced by the committee. 112 Therefore, to interpret
the rule correctly, courts should focus on the House committee's intent. 13 The
House committee report reveals an express intent to narrow the Supreme
Court's version of the rule to ensure fairness to the party against whom former
testimony is offered. The committee's deliberations manifest a concern that un-
fairness will result if a party is unable to rebut former testimony, unless there is
an identity between the party against whom the hearsay is offered and the party
who developed the testimony, or at least some connection between the parties in
the former and the instant proceeding. Consequently, the "predecessor in inter-
est" language connoting privity, or a closely analogous formal connection be-
tween the former and the instant party, was specifically added to preserve
fairness. 114 Any interpretation of rule 804(b)(1) that departs from a literal or
110. Courts have specifically looked to the views of members of the committee that holds con-
gressional hearings on the proposed legislation. See United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 68-80 (2d
Cir. 1977); United States v. Smith, 521 F.2d 968-69 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Pan Am. World Airways
v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 380 F.2d 770, 782 & n.14 (2d Cir. 1967), aff'd, 391 U.S. 461 (1968). With
regard to the Federal Rules of Evidence, Chairman Hungate and Representatives Holtzman and
Dennis, members of the House Subcommittee that drafted the Rules, have been viewed as authorita-
tive sources of legislative history when interpreting specific rules. See Oates, 560 F.2d at 69-70 n.26,
71-73 (deferring to Chairman Hungate as well as Representatives Holtzman and Dennis as authori-
ties); Smith, 521 F.2d at 968-69 n.24 (deferring to Chairman Hungate). Because the Subcommittee
on Criminal Justice did the actual mark-up work on rule 804(b)(1), members' comments during the
drafting process clarify its intended use. For an excerpt of pertinent parts of a rule 804(b)(1) mark-
up session, see supra note 99.
111. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 7051, 7074.
112. See Bindczyck v. Finucane, 342 U.S. 76, 83 (1951) (Court viewed committee amendment as
ultimately passed by Congress persuasive indicia of congressional intent); Advance Mach. Co. &
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 510 F. Supp. 360, 365 n.4 (D. Minn. 1981) (same). See generally
2A N. SINGER, supra note 109, § 48.06 (discussing persuasiveness of congressional committee
reports).
113. Lloyd v. Am-Export Lines, 580 F.2d 1179, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1978) (Ster, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 969 (1978).
114. For the text of the House Report, see supra text accompanying note 97.
The final House version of rule 804(b)(1), ultimately passed by the Senate, see supra note 101
and accompanying text, followed nationwide circulation and comment on the Committee Prints of
June 28, 1973, and October 10, 1973. The predecessor in interest language of rule 804(b)(1) and the
fairness policies embodied in the subcommittee report remained unaltered throughout the drafting
process. Rule 804(b)(1) in the committee print of June 1973 stated:
Hearsay exceptions-the following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is
unavailable as a witness:
(1) Former testimony-Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same
or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course
of another proceeding, [at the instance of or against a party with an opportunity to
develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination, with motive and inter-
est similar to those of the party against whom now offered.] ifthe party against whom
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formalistic application of the "predecessor in interest" language is therefore con-
trary to demonstrable legislative mandate.
V. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF RULE 804(B)(1)
Judicial interpretation of rule 804(b)(1) has been significantly influenced by
the 1978 case, Lloyd v. American Export Lines.1 15 In Lloyd the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the legislative history of rule
804(b)(1), and after quoting the Congressional reports, cited the Senate Report's
interpretation of the rule, saying, "We, too, fail to see a compelling difference
between the [the House version and the Supreme Court version]." '1 16 The court
construed the "predecessor in interest" language in rule 804(b)(1) as requiring
only a "sufficient community of interest" between the prior litigant and party
against whom the hearsay is offered.1 7 The Lloyd court rationalized its holding
by stating, "We strive to avoid interpretations that are wooden or mechanical,
like obsolete common-law pleadings, and to favor those that facilitate the pres-
entation of a complete picture to the fact-finder." 118 Discounting the fairness
policy, the court concluded its analysis of rule 804(b)(1) by asserting that
the testimony is now offered, or a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity to develop
the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.
(The words in brackets are the Court's version; italicized words are the subcommittee's changes).
The committee print of October 1973 stated:
Hearsay exceptions-The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is
unavailable as a witness:
Former testimony-testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a
different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of
the same or another proceeding, [at the instance of or against a party with an opportu-
nity to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination, with motive
and interest similar to those of the party against whom now offered.] if the party
against whom the testimony is now offered, or a predecessor in interest, had an opportu-
nity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect
examination.
115. 580 F.2d 1179 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 969 (1978).
116. Id. at 1185.
117. Id. at 1185-86. Judge Aldisert's definition of "interest" bears quoting:
Roscoe Pound has taught us that interests in law are "the claims or demands or desires
which human beings, either individually or in groups or associations or relations, seek to
satisfy... ." The interest implicated here was a claim or desire or demand which Alvarez
as an individual, and the Coast Guard as a representative of a larger group, sought to
satisfy, and which has been recognized as socially valid by authoritative decision-makers in
our society.
Id. at 1186. Compare Judge Aldisert's definition with the definition of "interest" from Black's Law
Dictionary, as quoted in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190
(E.D. Pa. 1980):
Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) defines "predecessor" as "the correlative of
'successor,'" ... and defines "successor in interest" as follows:
One who follows another in ownership or control of property. In order to be a "suc-
cessor in interest", a party must continue to retain the same rights as original owner
without change in ownership and there must be change in form only and not in sub-
stance, and transferee is not a "successor in interest." In case of corporations, the
term "successor in interest" ordinarily indicates statutory succession as, for instance,
when corporation changes its name but retains same property.
Id. at 1253 n.79 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1283-84 (5th ed. 1979) (citations omitted)).
118. Lloyd, 580 F.2d at 1186.
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"[u]nder these circumstances, the previous party having like motive to develop
the testimony about the same material fact is, in the final analysis, a predecessor
in interest to the present party." 119 In this case, the "predecessor in interest"
language acquired a fictional meaning.
While numerous federal courts have followed the Lloyd reasoning and con-
struction of rule 804(b)(1) and have concluded that the "predecessor in interest"
language of the rule should be interpreted broadly,120 judicial interpretations of
rule 804(b)(1) have been far from uniform. Some courts have emphasized that
Congress intended rule 804(b)(1) to be strictly construed because of fairness con-
siderations. 12 1 Other courts have not specifically focused on the legislative his-
tory of rule 804(b)(1) or expressly followed Lloyd, but have excluded prior
testimony evidence on the basis of absence of the appropriate motive. 122 Other
119. Id. at 1187. In a separate concurring opinion, Judge Stem pointed out that the court's
decision reduced the "predecessor in interest" language of rule 804(b)(1) to surplusage. Id. at 1190-
91 (Stern, J. concurring). Judge Stem urged that the testimony on this case could have been admit-
ted without rewriting rule 804(b)(1) under the residual hearsay rule, rule 804(b)(5). Id. at 1190,
1192 (Stem, J., concurring). Judge Stem's conclusion that rule 804(b)(5) would have been an appro-
priate basis for admission is questionable. See infra notes 145-52 and accompanying text (discussion
of impropriety of using residual hearsay exception rule when another evidentiary rule is directly
applicable).
120. See, eg., Dykes v. Raymark Indus., 801 F.2d 810, 815-16 (6th Cir. 1986) (deposition taken
in another asbestos trial admissible against defendant in present litigation because of similarity of
motive to cross-examine deponent), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1975 (1987); Clay v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 722 F.2d 1289, 1294-95 (6th Cir. 1983) (same), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1253 (1984);
Lerner v. Seaboard C. L. 1KR., 594 F. Supp. 963, 968 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (deposition taken in prior
railroad negligence case admitted in another case arising out of same accident because passenger/
plaintiff in first action deemed predecessor in interest to passenger/plaintiff in later action); Carpen-
ter v. Dizio, 506 F. Supp. 1117, 1123-24 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (former testimony admissible because
community of interest between examination of witness in prior criminal proceedings and present
civil action), aff'd, 673 F.2d 1298 (3d Cir. 1981).
121. See, eg., In re Paducah Towing Co., 692 F.2d 412, 418 (6th Cir. 1982) (former testimony
not reliable if witness not adequately cross-examined; admission of former testimony unfair when
opposing party or predecessor in interest did not have meaningful opportunity to cross-examine); In
re Screws Antitrust Litig., 526 F. Supp. 1318, 1319 (D. Mass. 1981) ("[The plain language of the
congressionally-approved words, 'predecessor in interest,' coupled with the clearly expressed intent
of the House of Representatives forestalls the complete rejection of the House's intent and the ac-
ceptance of rule 804(b)(1) as the Supreme Court originally submitted it."); Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190, 1245-55 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (Congress concerned with
fairness; when prior testimony offered against one co-defendant on basis of prior examination of
witness on behalf of different co-defendant, potentially conflicting interests and litigation strategies
come into play), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723
F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (Court did not consider eviden-
tiary issues); In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 444 F. Supp. 110, 112-13 (N.D.
Cal. 1978) (former testimony from three cases not admissible against company which was not a
party to them and not represented by predecessor in interest); In re Master Key Antitrust Litig., 72
F.R.D. 108, 109 (D. Conn. 1976) (version adopted by Congress "severely restricts" evidence that
original Supreme Court version would have admitted).
122. See Hannah v. Overland, 795 F.2d 1385, 1390-91 (8th Cir. 1986) (deposition taken in crimi-
nal action at which county prosecutor was present excluded from subsequent civil action against city
and individual police officers because of dissimilar motivation to develop testimony; issue of whether
prosecutor was predecessor in interest to city and police officers not reached); Lohrmann v. Pitts-
burgh Coming Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1160-61 (4th Cir. 1986) (in action of pipefitter who was ex-
posed to processed asbestos products, proper to exclude deposition testimony from prior action
regarding hazards of raw asbestos to plant workers because dissimilar motivation to develop testi-
mony due to unique health hazards of each case); Black Hills Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Gold Rush, Inc.,
633 F.2d 746, 752-53 (8th Cir. 1980) (former testimony not admissible because similar motive to
cross-examine not shown); Oberlin v. Marlin Am. Corp., 596 F.2d 1322, 1329 (7th Cir. 1979) (for-
mer testimony not admissible because crucial issue in present trial was not issue in prior action);
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courts have concluded that former testimony may be admitted when a substan-
tial identity of issues existed in the two actions, coupled with a similar motive
and meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the witness.12 3 Focusing primar-
ily on the similar motive criterion of rule 804(b)(1) has led some courts to ignore
the "predecessor in interest" prerequisite altogether in admitting prior
testimony. 124
Conflict among the federal courts concerning the admission of prior testi-
mony is illuminated by examining the many rationales employed to admit depo-
sitions from prior actions in the Johns-Manville asbestosis litigation. Several of
the asbestosis cases addressed the issue of the admissibility of depositions of Dr.
Kenneth Smith, a Johns-Manville employee until 1966, who died in 1977.125
Dr. Smith's depositions tended to establish prior notice to Johns-Manville of the
dangers of exposure to asbestos long before the danger was publicly acknowl-
edged. In some of the cases in which rule 804(b)(1) was applied, the interpreta-
tion of the "predecessor in interest" language was not at issue because the party
against whom the deposition was offered in the subsequent proceeding, Johns-
Manville Products Corporation, had been present and represented when Dr.
Smith's deposition was originally taken. In these cases the only question was
whether Johns-Manville had a similar interest and motivation to develop the
testimony in both the prior and subsequent proceedings.
126
In cases in which Johns-Manville was not the party against whom the
Smith deposition was offered, courts have split on whether or not to adopt
Creamer v. General Teamsters Local Union 326, 560 F. Supp. 495, 498-99 (D. Del. 1983) (testimony
of government witness in criminal trial of union president inadmissible in civil trial against employer
and union president, because, although owner and union president were alleged co-conspirators,
union president did not share same motive in cross-examination as employer because defense not
same as that of owner); In re Sterling Navigation Co., 444 F. Supp. 1043, 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(former testimony not admissible because given at nonadversarial hearing when present issues had
not been joined).
123. See, eg., Azalea Fleet, Inc. v. Dreyfus Supply & Mach. Corp., 782 F.2d 1455, 1460-60 (8th
Cir. 1986) (in indemnity action between supplier and seller of barge equipment arising out of barge
accident, proper to admit testimony from prior action against barge owner; barge owner was prede-
cessor in interest to seller of barge part because it had similar motive to develop testimony which
sought to prove that third party had caused accident); DeLuryea v. Winthrop Laboratory, 697 F.2d
222, 226-27 (8th Cir. 1983) (deposition taken for 1959 workers' compensation claim admissible in
present products liability action because testimony related to an issue relevant to both actions and
opposing party had opportunity to cross-examine); Murray v. Toyota Motor Distrib., Inc., 664 F.2d
1377, 1379 (9th Cir.) (per curiam) (in automotive dealer's action against distributor and importer for
antitrust violations, deposition testimony from another action against defendants was admissible
because defendants at prior trial had similar, although not "identical," motive to cross-examine
witness), cert denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982); Bailey v. South Pac. Transp. Co., 613 F.2d 1385, 1390
(5th Cir.) (per curiam) (former testimony "fits neatly" within rule 804(b)(1)'s requirements because
prior action involved same factual dispute and presented same motive for cross-examination), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 836 (1980).
124. See infra notes 133-43 (discussing cases that have eliminated the separate "predecessor in
interest" criteria of rule 804(b)(1) exclusively in favor of similar motive to develop testimony
criteria).
125. See, e.g., Clay v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 722 F.2d 1289, 1294 (6th Cir. 1983) (describ-
ing Dr. Smith's employment at Johns-Manville, nature of his notice to company of asbestos hazards,
action/parties present when deposition taken), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1253 (1984); Neal v. Carey
Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 385-86 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (same), aff'd, 760 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.
1985); In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1142, 1144-48 (N.D. Cal, 1982) (same).
126. See Neal, 548 F. Supp. at 385-86; Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. at 1147-48.
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Lloyd's expansive interpretation of rule 804(b)(1)'s "predecessor in interest" lan-
guage and admit Dr. Smith's deposition. For example, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois reviewed the legislative history of
rule 804(b)(1) and concluded that fairness policies expressed by Congress re-
quired a narrow construction of the rule. 127 The court, however, rejected the
notion that Congress intended a requirement of corporate privity when it in-
serted the "predecessor in interest" language in the rule.128 In this case, a sub-
sidiary of Johns-Manville was defending against a product liability claim, 129 and
the court, while not embracing the "community of interest" rationale of Lloyd,
admitted Dr. Smith's depositions because it was "eminently fair" to admit testi-
mony, elicited under cross-examination by Johns-Manville lawyers on behalf of
one Johns-Manville subsidiary, against other Johns-Manville entities.130 The
court avoided holding that the subsidiary in this litigation was the successor of
Johns-Manville Products because of uncertainties regarding the significance of
name changes of the company's subsidiaries.13 ' Focusing on the centralization
of key facets of Johns-Manville's operations, the court concluded that, for pur-
poses of the rule, there was but one de facto corporate entity; thus "even the
strictest reading of the 'predecessor' language [was] met."' 132 The particular
facts of the case make the result defensible in the context of the legislative man-
date of rule 804(b)(1).
By contrast, in Clay v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. 133 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit interpreted the rule expansively and held
that Dr. Smith's deposition could be admitted against co-defendant Raybestos-
Manhattan, Inc., another asbestos manufacturer, although Raybestos had not
been present during the deposition in the prior proceeding.' 34 Adopting the
Lloyd rationale, that court ruled that Johns-Manville, as an asbestos manufac-
turer like Raybestos, had a "similar motive" to cross-examine the witness and
make objections to the testimony when the deposition was taken; thus Johns-
Manville was fictionally Raybestos's predecessor in interest. 135
Clay's acceptance of the Lloyd reasoning effectively erased the "predecessor
in interest" language from rule 804(b)(1) for cases heard in the Sixth Circuit, as
two asbestos cases subsequent to Clay have acknowledged. In Murphy v. Owens-
Illinois, Inc. 136 the court refused to admit Dr. Smith's deposition wholly on the
basis of the similar motive requirement. The deposition was offered against the
127. In re Johns-Manville/Asbestosis Cases, 93 F.R.D. 853, 856 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 855.
130. Id. at 856.
131. Id. The Johns-Manville entities are "separate legal entities" in a workers' compensation
context, see In re Johns-Manville/Asbestosis Cases, 511 F. Supp. 1229, 1234 (N.D. Ill. 1981), but are
"successors in interest to J-M Products for purposes of the Dr. Smith depositions." Johns-Manvillel
Asbestosis Cases, 93 F.R.D. at 856.
132. Johns-Manville/Asbestosis Cases, 93 F.R.D. at 855.
133. 722 F.2d 1289 (6th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 467 U.S. 1253 (1984).
134. Id. at 1294-95.
135. Id. at 1295.
136. 779 F.2d 340, 340-44 (6th Cir. 1985).
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defendant company whose successor had been present when the deposition was
originally taken. 137 The court reasoned that, as Owens-Illinois had sold its in-
terest in asbestos manufacturing years before Dr. Smith's notice to Johns-
Manville about the dangers of the product, its motive in cross-examining a wit-
ness would have been dissimilar to that of a company manufacturing asbestos at
the time of Dr. Smith's notice. 138 Although the Murphy court construed rule
804(b)(1) to exclude the prior testimony, the court did state in dictum that the
two-part criteria for rule 804(b)(1) had been "collapsed" into one test by Clay
and Lloyd: whenever a similar motive to develop the testimony is found, the
former party is a predecessor in interest to the present party and prior testimony
may be admitted.
139
A 1986 case, Dykes v. Raymark Industries, Inc.,14° reaffirmed the one-part
Clay test for prior testimony under rule 804(b)(1), and admitted Dr. Smith's
deposition against a co-defendant asbestos producer which had not been present
at the deposition. 14 1 The Dykes court stressed that "[w]e do not view our deci-
sion in Clay as establishing the admissibility of Dr. Smith's deposition for all
purposes in all asbestos cases," 142 but placed the burden upon the defendant to
demonstrate the dissimilar motive in cross-examination between the present and
former parties when objecting to the former testimony. 143 Because defendant
did not clearly demonstrate this dissimilar motive to the trial court, the admis-
sion of Dr. Smith's deposition was upheld. 144
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in an effort to
resolve the troublesome task of interpreting the "predecessor in interest" lan-
guage of rule 804(b)(1), chose to circumvent both Lloyd and congressional in-
tent. In Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp. 145 the Fifth Circuit ruled that Dr. Smith's
deposition was properly admitted against two co-defendants who had not been
present at the deposition. The court avoided any interpretation of the "prede-
cessor in interest" language by admitting the testimony under Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(b)(5), one of the residual or "catchall" exceptions to the hearsay
137. Id. at 344 n.4.
138. Id. at 344. The court noted that Owens-Illinois had sold its asbestos division in 1958, and
that portions of Dr. Smith's testimony dealt with knowledge about asbestos hazards after that date.
The court agreed with defendant that its successor, who was present at the deposition of Dr. Smith,
would not want to develop testimony about industry standards and knowledge at the time Owens-
Illinois had an interest in the asbestos business. Id.
139. Id. at 343. "This court has, in effect, collapsed the two criteria into one test in Clay. The
Clay court adopted the position of Lloyd v. American Export Lines, Inc." Id. For a discussion of
Lloyd's interpretation of "predecessor in interest," see supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
140. 801 F.2d 810 (6th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 1975 (1987).
141. Id. at 815-16. The court explained that the predecessor in interest language was not meant
to be limited to a "legal relationship," but is also to be determined by the similar motive criteria of
the rule. Id. at 816.
142. Id. at 816.
143. Id. at 817. The present party should articulate "precisely what lines of questioning they
would have pursued" had they been a party in the former action. Id.
144. Id.





The Dartez case exemplifies a "near miss" situation, which has been defined
as one in which evidence "appears to fall within a category encompassed in one
of the specified hearsay exceptions, such as former testimony or business
records, but which failed to meet the precise requirements of the specific excep-
tion."' 4 7 Courts have expressly held it improper to use rule 804(b)(5) in circum-
stances in which another established hearsay exception is directly applicable.
148
The legislative history of rule 804(b)(5) reveals that the residual hearsay excep-
tions are to be used only for hearsay not circumscribed by the express excep-
tions. 149 Consequently, whenever a potential use of hearsay was specifically
146. Id. at 462. Rule 804(b)(5) and its identical counterpart, rule 803(24), the residual hearsay
exception which is not conditioned on the unavailability of the declarant, provide:
OTHER EXCEPTIONS. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing excep-
tions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court deter-
mines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these
rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into
evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the pro-
ponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing
to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponents
intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of
the declarant.
FED. R. EvID. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
147. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190, 1262-64 (E.D. Pa.
1980), rev'd sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 301-03 (3d Cir.
1983), rev"d on other grounds sub nom. Mitsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574 (1986) (Court did not consider evidentiary issue).
148. Creamer v. General Teamsters Local Union 326, 560 F. Supp. 495, 498 (D. Del. 1983);
Zenith Radio Corp., 505 F. Supp. at 1262-64. For a discussion of whether rule 804(b)(5) can be used
in place of rule 804(b)(1) to admit transcripts of grand jury testimony in subsequent criminal trials,
see Weissenberger, supra note 17, at 340-52; see also United States v. Vigoa, 656 F. Supp. 1499, 1506
(D.N.J. 1987) (district court rejected admission of grand jury testimony under rule 804(b)(5) because
former testimony could not have been properly admitted under rule 804(b)(1)). The Vigoa court
emphasized that the residual hearsay exception should be used to admit hearsay only under very
narrow circumstances, and not when the admission of hearsay would undermine the policy mani-
fested by existing rules. Id. The court asserted that to admit the grand jury testimony under rule
804(b)(5) would impermissibly subvert the fairness policies incorporated into rule 804(b)(1). Id. at
1505.
149. The residual hearsay exceptions were changed dramatically during the course of congres-
sional review of the Supreme Court's version of the rules. The rules were intended to be used spar-
ingly, but to provide judges with a device for admitting hearsay in situations unanticipated by the
other exceptions, yet bearing similar guarantees of trustworthiness. FED. R. EVID. 803(24) advisory
committee's note. The Supreme Court approved the draft of the rules submitted by its advisory
committee and transmitted the draft to Congress on February 5, 1973. Rules of Evidence for United
States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183 (1973). The House Subcommittee on Criminal Jus-
tice, however, viewed the residual exceptions as providing judges with too much discretion in admit-
ting hearsay, thus undermining the purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence in providing for certain
and predictable hearsay rules. See H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 5-6, reprinted in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 7075, 7079. The Senate Judiciary Committee acknowledged
the House's concern; nonetheless, it reinstated a revised version of the residual exceptions to be used
with caution to cover unanticipated situations in which existing hearsay exceptions would not apply.
S. R P. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18-20, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
7051, 7065-66. The Senate Report explains:
The committee does not intend to establish a broad license for trial judges to admit hearsay
statements that do not fall within one of the other exceptions contained in Rules 803 and
804(b). The residual exceptions are not meant to authorize major judicial revisions of the
hearsay rule, including its present exceptions.
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contemplated but consciously rejected in the Rules' overall design, using the
residual exceptions to resurrect that rejected class of hearsay and render it ad-
missible is in derogation of its intended exclusion elsewhere in the Rules. The
Senate Judiciary Committee explained:
First, [the hearsay statement] must have 'equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness.' Second, it must be offered as evidence
of a 'material fact.' Third, the court must determine that the statement
'is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts
.... Fourth, the court must determine that 'the general purposes of
these rules and the interests ofjustice will best be served by admission of
the statement into evidence.'15
0
The residual exceptions, then, are to be applied in a manner which will not sub-
vert the policy considerations supporting the hearsay rule and its specified ex-
ceptions.151 Before the residual exceptions are applied in a "near-miss"
Id. at 7066. The Conference Committee subsequently agreed in pertinent part with the Senate's
version of the residual exceptions, but restricted it further by adding a requirement that the opposing
party be given adequate notice of the proponent's intent to request that hearsay be admitted under
one of the residual exceptions. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d. Cong., 2d Sess. 11-13, reprinted in
1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 7098, 7105-06. The conferees' version was ultimately
adopted by both houses of Congress. For text of the final version of rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5), see
supra note 146.
150. S. RaP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2nd Sess. 19-20 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 7051, 7066 (emphasis added).
151. Clause (C) of the residual exceptions demands that "the general purposes of these rules and
the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence." FED. R.
EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5). Professor Sonenshein explains this requirement:
A reasonable interpretation of clause (C) requires that the admission of hearsay not be
inconsistent with the interests ofjustice. While this standard should be viewed flexibly, the
additional requirement that the proffer not undermine the spirit or letter of the other Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence should be viewed more stringently. Thus, if the admission of the
hearsay under the residual exception runs afoul of some other Federal Rule, the other rule
should control to exclude the hearsay. Where Congress has specifically addressed an issue
in another rule, the more general language of the residual exceptions must give way. Other-
wise, litigants will be able to circumvent the particularized requirements envisioned by
Congress.
Sonenshein, The Residual Exceptions to the Federal Hearsay Rule: Two Exceptions in Search of a
Rule, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 867, 900-01 (1982).
Courts have also held that the residual hearsay exceptions are to be used sparingly and not
where another rule applies. See, e.g., In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 756 F.2d 411 (5th
Cir. 1985) (legislative history indicates rule 804(b)(5) to be used only under exceptional circum-
stances; evidence inadmissible under rule 803(5) also inadmissible under residual exception); Robin-
son v. Shapiro, 646 F.2d 734, 742-43 & n.6 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting that Congress did not want the
residual exceptions to "swallow" other exceptions); United States v. Metz, 608 F.2d 147, 157 (Sth
Cir. 1979) (statement inadmissible under rule 804(b)(3) inadmissible under rule 804(b)(5)), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 821 (1980); United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 763-66 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (absence of
factors making telex trustworthy under rule 803(6) also render it inadmissible under rule 803(24));
Creamer v. General Teamsters Local Union 326, 560 F. Supp. 495, 498 (D. Del. 1983) ("where there
is a specific hearsay exception applicable to a clearly defined category of evidence such as former
testimony, but the evidence fails to satisfy the requirements of the specific exception, the evidence
should not be admitted under the residual exception"); Electroglas, Inc. v. Dynatex Corp., 497 F.
Supp. 97, 103 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (statement cannot be admitted under rule 804(b)(5) when specifically
excluded by another exception); see also Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153
(1976) ("It is a basic principle of statutory construction that a statute dealing with a narrow, precise,
and specific subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more generalized spec-
trum."). See generally G. WEISSENBERGER, supra note 8, § 804.32 (discussing stringent require-
ments for residual hearsay exceptions).
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situation, it is necessary to ask whether the policies of the "nearly-missed" ex-
ception will be excessively compromised. In some cases, a court may justifiably
resolve a near-miss situation in favor of admissibility under the residual excep-
tion without frustrating the discernable policy of the pertinent express exception,
because most hearsay exceptions embody only an accuracy policy. As long as
the hearsay offered pursuant to the residual exception is no less reliable than that
admitted pursuant to the "nearly-missed" express exception, the hearsay system
is not compromised. Whatever the appropriate "near-miss" resolution may be
with regard to accuracy-based hearsay exceptions, the analysis assumes different
dimensions in regard to the former testimony exception, which delimits admissi-
bility on the basis of fairness. In this context, the "near-miss" analysis must
respect the conscious policy decisions reflected in rule 804(b)(1), and deny ad-
mission under the residual exceptions.
15 2
The asbestosis cases vividly illustrate not only conflicts among the federal
courts concerning the proper interpretation of rule 804(b)(1), but also the com-
peting interests of fairness and accuracy. Cases admitting former testimony
under the broad rationale of Lloyd and Clay concentrate on the probative value
and utility of the testimony to be admitted. These cases involve sympathetic
plaintiffs seeking judicial relief for serious injuries and deaths, and admission of
prior testimony crucial to determining the asbestos manufacturer's liability.
Consequently, ignoring the "predecessor in interest" provisions of rule 804(b)(1)
may seem understandable and even compassionate. Yet, overly elastic interpre-
tations of rule 804(b)(1) undermine fundamental values of the adversary system
of litigation, and may ultimately have an undesirable impact on other litigants.
For example, in Lerner v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co. 153 the district court
for the Southern District of New York admitted depositions taken by a different
plaintiff in a prior suit which exonerated defendant railroad company for the
same accident. The plaintiff in the former trial was fictionalized as a predecessor
in interest to the plaintiff in the second trial even though the second plaintiff had
no opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, and no relationship existed be-
tween the plaintiffs other than the common nucleus of facts related to the train
accident.1
5 4
In some courts, judicial liberalization of rule 804(b)(1) has effectively re-
placed Congress' rule with the version originally proposed by the Supreme
Court. Such judicial initiative in generously admitting prior testimony evidence
is strongly supported by many commentators, but raises difficult questions con-
cerning the degree to which judicial power can vary the explicit mandate of
statutorily enacted rules. This issue is addressed in the next section of this
Article.
152. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (discussing requirement that hearsay admitted
under rule 804(b)(5) must not undermine existing rules).
153. 594 F. Supp. 963 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
154. Id. at 968.
1989]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
VI. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
This Article has sought to demonstrate that the congressional amendments
to rule 804(b)(1) are, indeed, a departure from the Supreme Court's version, and
that the "predecessor in interest" language of the enacted version of rule
804(b)(1) reflects a distinct divergence in policy when compared to the
superceded version originally submitted by the Supreme Court.1 "- Similarly,
this Article has endeavored to show that courts have applied rule 804(b)(1) in
contravention of the manifest legislative intent. In a very real sense Congress'
rulemaking authority is tested when courts apply rule 804(b)(1) in a manner that
conflicts with express legislative mandate. 156 Congress' vast authority to pro-
mulgate procedural and evidentiary rules for the federal courts is well settled, 15 7
and consequently courts may not freely substitute the Supreme Court's proposed
version of rule 804(b)(l)-in preference to Congress' version without some defen-
sible justification. As recently stated by the Supreme Court, the Federal Rules
of Evidence are a "legislative enactment" to be construed by the "traditional
tools of statutory construction." 
158
The final section of this Article will examine whether any justification exists
for federal courts' violation of the well-established principle that the federal judi-
ciary must follow legitimately enacted procedural rules. There are only two
plausible justifications. First, one can argue that Congress exceeded its authority
when it enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence, and rule 804(b)(1) in particular.
Second, one can argue that federal courts possess the delegated authority to en-
gage in case-by-case evidentiary rulemaking in derogation of express legislative
enactments of procedural rules. Each of these possible justifications will be
evaluated.
A. The Rulemaking Power of Congress and the Courts
When the Supreme Court promulgated the Federal Rules of Evidence,
159
serious questions were raised about the Court's authority to prescribe the
Rules. 160 The Rules were promulgated pursuant to congressional enabling au-
thority granting the Supreme Court the power to prescribe rules governing the
practice and procedure of the federal courts, provided that such rules did not
155. For a discussion of the policies underlying the Supreme Court's version of rule 804(b)(1)
compared to Congress' amended version, see supra notes 92-113 and accompanying text.
156. For a discussion of courts broadly interpreting the predecessor in interest language of rule
804(b)(1) in conflict with the express intent of Congress, seesupra notes 115-23 & 133-43 and accom-
panying text.
157. See infra notes 168-76 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' rulemaking power
stemming from both article I and article III of the Constitution).
158. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainy, 57 U.S.L.W. 4043, 4046 (Dec. 12, 1988) (citing INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987)).
159. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972). The
Rules were to take effect 90 days after submission to Congress, pursuant to an enabling act granting
the Supreme Court the power to prescribe rules governing the practice and procedure of the federal
courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970). The Rules were also promulgated under statutes. See, e.g., 18
U.S.C. §§ 3402, 3771, 3772 (1970) (criminal practice and procedure). The Rules were to take effect
ninety days after submission to Congress. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
160. Comment, Powers, supra note 2, at 1059-60.
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"abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." 161 Critics examined the
rules closely to guard against the possibility that the Court had exceeded its
authority under the Enabling Act by prescribing certain rules which were
outside the scope of "practice and procedure." 162 The privilege provisions in
particular were scrutinized to determine if they were substantive rules and, as
such, beyond the Court's rulemaking power. 163 Also, arguments were advanced
that the promulgation of a code of evidentiary rules by the Supreme Court vio-
lated constitutional proscriptions against giving advisory opinions, because "ju-
dicial power" only entitled courts to determine evidentiary rules in the context
of adjudicating individual disputes. 164 These issues became moot, however,
when Congress intervened in the process with legislation stipulating that the
Rules of Evidence would not take effect until they were expressly approved by
Congress. 16 5 Once Congress asserted its rulemaking authority and reviewed,
amended, and ultimately enacted rules promulgated by the Supreme Court's ad-
visory committee, the issue became solely one of whether such congressional
action was a legitimate legislative function.
161. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
162. See Comment, Powers, supra note 2, at 1059-60. Justice Douglas dissented from the
Supreme Court's order promulgating the Rules, alleging that the Court could make rules only on a
case-by-case basis. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 185
(1972). Critics offered four objections to the Supreme Court's version of the Rules of Evidence. The
Rules were criticized for not recognizing applicable state substantive law in areas such as privileges.
The article on privilege was criticized by those who wanted either to extend or to limit the protection
of privileged relationships. There were objections to the liberalization of the hearsay exceptions.
Some of the rules regulating the procedure for admitting and excluding evidence were criticized,
such as the rules concerning the scope of cross-examination, the power of the judge to comment on
the evidence, and the adjudication of preliminary facts. 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 2,
§ 5006, at 106-07.
163. See Comment, Powers, supra note 2, at 1059-60. Privilege rules are arguably substantive
because they promote social policy rather than regulating court procedure. They stem from the
legislature's policy decision to protect certain interpersonal relationships, even at the expense of
leaving the truth uncovered in some lawsuits. Id. at 1072-73; see Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S.
1 (1941). In Sibbach the Court stated that the test for differentiating between substance and proce-
dure "must be whether a rule really regulates procedure-the judicial process for enforcing rights
and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disre-
gard or infraction of them." Id. at 14. Commentators generally conclude that most rules of evi-
dence are procedural under the Sibbach test because they involve the orderly conduct of judicial
business. See Green, Preliminary Study of the Advisability and Feasibility of Developing Uniform
Rules of Evidence for the Federal Courts, 30 F.R.D. 79, 101-08, 114-15 (1961); Joiner, Uniform Rules
of Evidence for the Federal Courts, 20 F.R.D. 429, 435 (1957); Joiner & Miller, Rules of Practice and
Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule Making, 55 MICH. L. REv. 623, 651 (1957); Comment, Powers,
supra note 2, at 1069-70.
164. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 185 (1973)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
165. Pub. L. No. 93-12 (Mar. 30, 1973). Prior to Congress' intervention in the promulgation of
the evidence rules, the Supreme Court established rules of procedure without congressional modifi-
cation. The authority to establish such rules was sometimes characterized as "judicial rulemaking
pursuant to legislative delegation and subject to Congressional veto." 4 C. WRIGHT & 0. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES § 1001, at 6 (1982). The Rules of Civil and Criminal Proce-
dure were reported to and approved by Congress; however, the Supreme Court's drafts of these rules
were not revised. Moore & Bendix, supra note 2, at 36-38. Congress altered significantly the
Supreme Court's version of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Martin, supra note 2, at 168-69. "In
spite of the substantial flexibility retained in the structure of the Federal Rules, it is clear that the
purpose of many of the changes made by Congress was to require the exclusion of evidence that
would have been admissible under the rules prescribed by the Supreme Court." Id. at 169. Thereaf-
ter, Congress enacted the Rules on January 2, 1975. Pub. L. No. 93-595 (Jan. 2, 1975).
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Power over procedure is not expressly granted either to the Court or to
Congress by the Constitution. While article III of the Constitution does give
federal courts the power to decide "cases" and "controversies," 166 Congress
wields vast power over the courts. This power is apparent in Congress' recog-
nized authority to create the lower courts,
167 to provide for their jurisdiction,
168
and to provide for the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 169 Because
there are no express constitutional provisions addressing the prescription of
rules of procedure for the federal courts, it is necessary to look to several sources
to determine Congress' ultimate authority to make procedural rules. In 1924
Professors Frankfurter and Landis argued that any conclusions about rulemak-
ing authority are necessarily dependent upon an historical analysis of the exer-
cise of the authority to make procedural rules, because there are no abstract
analytical lines separating the procedural rulemaking powers of the courts and
Congress.170 Several commentators have demonstrated that Congress has
widely exercised its authority to prescribe rules for the federal courts since its
initial legislation creating the inferior federal courts. 171 History thus belies any
contention that Congress' role in reviewing, redrafting, and enacting the Federal
Rules of Evidence constituted a novel and unwarranted assertion of rulemaking
authority. 172
Historically, many legislative acts have delegated authority for procedural
matters to the Court, 173 but Congress also has exercised its own authority and
166. Article III describes "the judicial power" as follows:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Consti-
tution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Con-
suls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a party;-to Controversies between two or more States;-between a
State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different States;-between Citi-
zens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
167. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 1.
168. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 448-49 (8 How. 1850) (Congress having power to establish
inferior federal courts may determine limits of their jurisdiction); Redish & Woods, Congressional
Power to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis,
124 U. PA. L. Rav. 45, 52-55 (1975) (asserting that Congress' power to prescribe rules for federal
courts' jurisdiction derives from its article III powers).
169. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that Congress has sweep-
ing powers to limit the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. See Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 506 (1868) (while appeal was before Supreme Court, Congress repealed act giving Court
appellate jurisdiction in habeas corpus matter).
170. Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Infer-
ior" Federal Courts--A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARv. L. RaV. 1010, 1017-18 (1924).
171. See id. at 1018-19 (demonstrating that Congress has legislated a vast range of evidentiary
and procedural matters for the federal courts since 1789); Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power In
Criminal Case" Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1433, 1466-74 (1984) (detailing the history of Congress' active role in procedural
rulemaking).
172. See, eg., Moore & Bendix, supra note 2, at 9-10 (suggesting that Congress' role in amending
the Federal Rules of Evidence was not only ill-advised, but a departure from its historical role of
deference to the courts for rulemaking).
173. See supra note 165 (explaining that prior to Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress frequently
delegated rulemaking authority to the courts).
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has acted affirmatively with regard to procedural rulemaking. 17 4 The broad
constitutional powers granted to Congress under the "necessary and proper"
clause 175 and Congress' power to regulate jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts 176 historically have justified congressional prescription of rules for the
federal court system. 177 Moreover, the lower federal courts are statutorily cre-
ated by Congress, and Congress obviously restricted the power of these federal
trial and appellate courts to originate or alter any rules of procedure. 178 From
this perspective, and considering the history of congressional enactments of pro-
cedural and evidentiary rules, "[one is] enabled to appreciate the intent and the
extent of the dynamic power specifically conferred by the Constitution upon
Congress when authorized 'to constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme
Court.' In truth, these courts live and move and have their being through the
legislation of Congress."' 179 Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly and spe-
cifically acknowledged the supremacy of Congress' power to make procedural
rules. 180
Congress' actions with regard to the Federal Rules of Evidence are entirely
consistent with its frequent exercise of the power to enact procedural rules.
Nevertheless, most commentators agree that the constitutional power to make
rules of court procedure is neither exclusively legislative nor judicial.' 8' They
conclude that the Supreme Court possesses the power to promulgate procedural
rules subject to the authorization and limits established by Congress. Similarly,
Congress' ability to legislate matters that directly affect a coordinate branch of
government is not unrestricted: succinctly stated, "Congress cannot impede the
functioning" of the courts in the process of adjudicating disputes. 182 Whether
Congress exceeded its authority to prescribe rules of court practice in enacting
174. See generally Beale, supra note 171, at 1436-39, 1466-68 (detailing congressional action
pertaining to court procedure).
175. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18. "Congress shall have the power to make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution ... all... Powers vested by this Constitu-
tion in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." Id.
176. See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text (discussing jurisdictional powers of Con-
gress under article III).
177. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9 (1941).
178. Beale, supra note 171, at 1473-74. Professor Beale explains that commencing with the stat-
utory creation of the lower federal courts, Congress has established certain procedural rules, includ-
ing the delegation of authority to the courts to promulgate other rules. But Congress has always
exercised overriding authority to regulate procedural matters. Thus, these legislative enactments left
the lower courts with minimal ancillary authority, the scope of which must be determined by exam-
ining the provisions of the legislative acts. Id.; see also Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 170, at
1018-20 (attributing to Congress the power to prescribe procedural rules through its power to estab-
lish federal courts).
179. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 170, at 1020.
180. See Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 353 n.11 (1959) ("Congress has the power to
prescribe rules of procedure for the federal courts, and has from the earliest days exercised that
power."); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9 (1941) ("Congress has undoubted power to regu-
late the practice and procedure of federal courts"); see also Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 381-
82 (1933) (Congress has ultimate authority over evidentiary and procedural rules in federal courts;
only in absence of legislation may courts engage in case-by-case rulemaking).
181. See, eg., Comment, Rulemaking, supra note 2, at 83; Comment, Powers, supra note 2, at
1067.
182. See Comment, Powers, supra note 2, at 1067.
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the Federal Rules of Evidence, and rule 804(b)(1) in particular, may be deter-
mined only by an examination of the possibility that Congress' enactment of the
Rules encroaches upon the implied powers of the judiciary branch. Such judi-
cial powers are the only conceivable limitation on Congress' rulemaking
authority.
The federal courts' inherent rulemaking power arguably is implicit in the
grant of "the judicial power" to the Supreme Court.1 83 Implied powers of the
executive1 84 and legislative 185 branches of the government have been recognized
as necessary for the effective implementation of the powers expressly granted to
those branches; similarly, the judiciary holds implied, ancillary powers necessary
to carry out its business which are immune from interference by either of the
other coordinate branches. 186 Not known for equivocation, Dean Wigmore
once contended that federal courts hold inherent power to make procedural
rules, granted exclusively to them under the "judicial power" clause of article
III. According to Wigmore, any congressional enactments of evidence rules are
therefore void.1 87 Wigmore's extreme position, however, does not comport with
the historical fact that the Supreme Court has long expressly recognized and
acquiesced to Congress' ultimate authority over the practice and procedure of
the federal courts.
1 88
It has also been suggested that while Congress may have vast authority to
enact evidentiary and procedural rules for the federal courts, certain procedural
rules, such as the power to punish for contempt, are so necessary for the proper
adjudication of cases that they are exempt from any interference by Congress. 
189
It follows, according to this theory, that the courts may have a constitutionally
based inherent authority to prescribe certain rules, arguably including eviden-
tiary rules, but only if those rules are necessary for the proper functioning of the
courts. In an imaginative article, Professor Martin has taken the position that
the federal courts are supreme over Congress regarding some of the Rules of
Evidence, including rule 804(b)(1), because those rules exemplify the kind of
evidentiary control indispensable to a court's functioning, especially with regard
to the need for consistency.190 Consequently, according to Martin, the courts
can ignore Congress' version of rule 804(b)(1) in favor of the Supreme Court's
183. See Beale, supra note 171, at 1468-70 (1984); Martin, supra note 2, at 179-81; Wigmore, All
Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure are Void Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. REV. 276 (1928);
Comment, Rulemaking, supra note 2, at 82 (citing R. HARRIS, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE
UNITED STATES 153 (1940)).
184. See, eg., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
185. See, eg., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401-03 (1819).
186. See Beale, supra note 171, at 1470-73; Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining
Incidental Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of
"The Sweeping Clause", 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 788, 796-99 (1975).
187. Wigmore, supra note 183, at 277.
188. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9 (1941) ("Congress has undoubted power to
regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts").
189. See Beale, supra note 171, at 1469; Martin, supra note 2, at 185-86 (citing Anderson v.
Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227-29 (1821)).
190. Martin, supra note 2, at 181-83.
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version. 191 Professor Martin's premise is questionable because the very purpose
of the Federal Rules of Evidence is to create uniformity which was previously
lacking in evidentiary rules in the federal courts. Moreover, Professor Martin's
unconventional argument that "indispensible" rules may be ignored in complete
disregard of congressional intent192 is at odds with the frequently expressed po-
sition of the Supreme Court that federal courts may engage in case-by-case
rulemaking only in the absence of congressional provisions to the contrary.
193
Martin's arguments do not comport with the mainstream view that the
courts may have the power to determine some rules of procedure, but that Con-
gress has retained and exercised the power to supersede them and prescribe its
own rules. 194 Indeed, while the Supreme Court has recognized that courts have
some inherent rulemaking powers, it has construed them very narrowly and
found them to exist only when absolutely necessary for order and decorum in
court.195 The nonexclusive nature of these judicial powers is confirmed by the
fact that the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of congressional
enactments regulating federal courts' powers to punish for contempt.
196
The foremost case in which the Supreme Court voided a congressional act
because it encroached on judicial functions is United States v. Klein. 197 In Klein,
post-Civil War legislation was held to be unconstitutional because it essentially
dictated the manner in which judges should decide specific cases by requiring
judges to assess certain evidence as conclusive proof of the fact in question.
198
191. Martin, supra note 2, at 179. According to Martin, evidence rules are part of the inherent
judicial power because they are "indispensable to the exercise of the power." Id. at 182. Martin
argues that there must be consistency in the rules for "consistent 'lawful' results." Id. Historically,
principles governing the admissibility of evidence largely have been judicial creations. Id. Further-
more, if evidence rules were formulated outside the courts, they "could be fashioned [in a way] that
would prevent courts from... deciding controversies." Id. at 183. Martin concludes that those
rules that affect only the conduct of the decision-making process at trial are inherent in the judicial
power. Accordingly, Congress' alterations do not intercede the Court's draft of those rules. Id. at
195.
192. Martin, supra note 2, at 193.
193. See Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 353 n.11 (1959) ("The power of this Court to
prescribe rules of procedure and evidence for the federal courts exists only in the absence of a rele-
vant act of Congress."); see also Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414, 418 (1953) ("In the absence
of specific legislation, questions of this nature [necessity of production of written statements in pos-
session of government] are governed 'by the principles of the common law as they may be inter-
preted by the courts of the United States .... '" (citation omitted)); Funk v. United States, 290 U.S.
371, 379 (1933) (stating that with regard to competency of witnesses, federal courts are bound by
common law if Congress has not provided otherwise).
194. 10 J. MOORE, supra note 2, at 87.
195. Beale, supra note 171, at 1469.
196. Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 64-66 (1924) (upholding Congress' authority to
pass legislation limiting the contempt powers of federal judges under the Clayton Act); Ex parte
Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 511 (1873) (upholding constitutionality of the Act of March 2,
1831, Congress' initial legislation restricting federal courts' powers to punish for contempt). The
Supreme Court has deferred to Congress as the authority for prescribing modem civil and criminal
contempt statutes. 18 U.S.C. §§ 401-402 (1982); see In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 233-34 (1961)
(Congress intended federal courts to construe § 401 narrowly; purpose is to limit courts' contempt
power.)
197. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146-48 (1871). The Klein court stated that when Congress forbids
courts to give proper effect to evidence, it "has inadvertently passed the limit which separates the
legislative from the judicial power." Id. at 147.
198. In 1868 President Johnson issued a general pardon for former speakers of the Confederacy,
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Certainly, it cannot be reasonably argued that the congressionally enacted Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence restrict a judge's ability to decide a case to such an extent.
Moreover, since the federal courts did function adequately for many years with-
out a code of evidentiary rules, 199 it is difficult to suggest that a set of rules,
much less a specific hearsay rule such as rule 804(b)(1), is so essential to a
court's ability to adjudicate disputes between parties that Congress exceeded its
constitutional authority when it enacted the rule.
There is no convincing support for the contention that rule 804(b)(1) and
the other Federal Rules of Evidence represent an excessive exercise of legislative
authority over the federal courts. In the context of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, Congress elected to exercise its ultimate authority over the courts by in-
terrupting the Court's rulemaking process and altering certain rules, including
rule 804(b)(1). Consequently, Congress' legitimate exercise of its constitutional
power cannot be ignored when courts interpret rule 804(b)(1).
B. Statutory Authorization of the Court's Case-by-Case Rulemaking Authority
Congressionally enacted statutory provisions delegating rulemaking author-
ity to the courts must be considered as the only other possible source of author-
ity for a departure from a formalistic interpretation of rule 804(b)(1).
Alternatively stated, congressionally authorized latitude in the interpretation of
rules arguably may justify courts' disregard of Congress' express mandate.
Federal judges may use their discretion in formulating rules of procedure if
Congress has granted such authority. Throughout the history of the courts,
Congress has granted such authority to the federal courts, provided that such
procedural rules are not in conflict with established rules of the Supreme Court
and acts of Congress. 2°° For example, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
contain specific provisions for rulemaking by the courts.20 1 In contrast, the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence are more restrictive, and except where expressly provided
by an evidence rule, there is no authority for court-made reconstruction of evi-
dentiary rules.202 As a result, unless there is a specific express grant of latitude
applicable to rule 804(b)(1), judges are not at liberty to use their discretion to
depart from a literal application of the "predecessor in interest" requirement of
that rule.
allowing them to obtain compensation for lands abandoned to federal troops during the Civil War.
Congress subsequently passed legislation which required the Court of Claims and the Supreme Court
to treat the fact that the individual had accepted the pardon as conclusive evidence that he had
supported the rebellion, but to ignore the pardon in determining whether he satisfied the requirement
of loyalty to the United States. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 39-40 (1978).
199. See Comment, Rulemaking, supra note 2, at 83 (explaining that the Court's rulemaking
power is dependent on congressional grant because such power is not important to the integrity of
the judicial function, as demonstrated by the facility with which the Court had operated without
making rules governing procedure in federal courts).
200. See, eg., Judiciary Act of 1793, 1 Stat. 333; 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1982).
201. See FED. R. CIv. P. 83. "[un cases not provided for by these rules, the district courts may
regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules." Id.




A number of commentators have suggested that evidence rule 102, "Pur-
pose and Construction," provides statutory authority for discretion in interpre-
tation and application of all evidence rules. 20 3 While it does not appear that a
district or circuit court has specifically applied rule 102 as a rationale for substi-
tuting individual judgment for the express language of rule 804(b)(1), rule 102
has been used as a basis for disregarding the literal application of other rules of
evidence.204 Finding authority in rule 102 to disregard the express language of
other evidence rules is highly questionable. Congressional deliberations con-
cerning the Federal Rules of Evidence clearly demonstrate that, except in nar-
rowly defined situations, federal judges should not exercise discretion to the
point of ignoring the literal mandate of the rules. 20 5 The more appropriate anal-
ysis suggests that rule 102 should be used in conjunction with rules specifically
and expressly authorizing judicial discretion, latitude, or judgment,20 6 or in
cases in which an evidentiary determination is needed that cannot be decided
from a literal application of any existing rule.
207
The most defensible position is that Congress has expressly legislated
against case-by-case rulemaking, that is, judicial revisionism, as evidenced by
Congress' clear intent to continue as the final authority for evidentiary rulemak-
ing in the federal courts. Congress amended rule 402, the general rule authoriz-
ing the admission of relevant evidence, to read: "[E]xcept as otherwise provided
by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or
by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority
203. See, eg., Moore & Bendix, supra note 2, at 12-13; 1 S. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra
note 6, % 102[01], at 102-6 to -7 (1986). Federal Rule of Evidence 102 reads: "These rules shall be
construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and
promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be
ascertained and proceedings justly determined." FED. R. EvID. 102.
204. S. SALZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 43, at 14 (citing United States v. American Cyana-
mid Co., 427 F. Supp. 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), and United States v. Batts, 558 F.2d 513 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1978)).
205. House deliberations on the Rules of Evidence indicate concern for uniformity among the
circuits. It was the understanding of House members that courts might effect their own rules in
areas not covered by the federal rules, but would not be able to "hold adversely to the codified rules
of evidence." 120 CONG. REc. 2,1413-14 (1974).
The following excerpt is illustrative:
Mr. HUTCHINSON. But so far as the codification itself is concerned it would not be
possible legally for a judge in any court to provide a rule of evidence at variance with this
modification. So far as the codification reaches, it will be uniform throughout the country.
Mr. SMITH of New York. I would say to the gentleman that is correct. In many of the
rules that we have proposed, the judges have a certain amount of discretion as to whether
to allow evidence in or out depending upon the cases as outlined in the codified rule.
It would be my answer that a judge would not be able to hold adversely to the codified
rules of evidence and that the only way those could be changed would be through further
legislation. In the event that some rule turns out in practice to be one that reasonable people
would agree ought to be changed, it would be subject to further legislation for amendment.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. I thank the gentleman very much for his responses.
Id. (emphasis added).
206. 1 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 3, at 7 (1977) (citing the catchall
hearsay exceptions, rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5), as examples).
207. See S. SALZBIURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 43, at 14. The authors state that if judges use
rule 102 to disregard a specific rule, the entire notion of a uniform set of evidentiary rules is under-
mined. Id.
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.... ,,208 Congress added the emphasized phrase to the version of rule 402 sub-
mitted by the Court "[tlo accommodate the view that the Congress should not
appear to acquiesce in the court's judgment that it has authority under the ex-
isting Rules Enabling Act to promulgate Federal Rules of Evidence. '209 As a
further assurance of its continued role in evidentiary rulemaking Congress pre-
empted the act under which the Supreme Court promulgated the Rules of Evi-
dence in 1972.210 The new enabling act allows Congress to have "veto power"
over any amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence within 180 days after
submission by the Supreme Court.211 Moreover, it mandates affirmative con-
gressional enactments of rules affecting privileges.
2 12
Congress has made abundantly clear that case-by-case rulemaking by the
federal courts is inappropriate in the absence of specific legislation that so pro-
vides. Moreover, the Supreme Court has acknowledged Congress' plenary role
in evidentiary rulemaking since the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence.2 13 Accordingly, rule 804(b)(1) is inappropriately undermined when
courts engage in independent rulemaking by ignoring the rule's legislative man-
date and express language. To paraphrase Justice Jackson's concurrence in the
Steel Seizure Case,2 14 federal courts like those in Lloyd215 or Clay2 16 are at their
"lowest ebb" of constitutional authority when they ignore congressional modifi-
208. FED. R. EvID. 402 (emphasis added).
209. HOUSE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, FED. RULES OF EVIDENCE, H.R. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 7075, 7081.
210. See supra notes 161-64 (discussing Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072).
211. 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1976). This enabling act for the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
The Supreme Court of the United States shall have the power to prescribe amendments to
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Such amendments shall not take effect until they have been
reported to Congress by the Chief Justice at or after the beginning of a regular session of
Congress but not later than the first day of May, and until the expiration of one hundred
and eighty days after they have been so reported; but if either House of Congress within
that time shall by resolution disapprove any amendment so reported it shall not take effect.
The effective date of any amendment so reported may be deferred by either House of Con-
gress to a later date or until approved by Act of Congress. Any rule whether proposed or
in force may be amended by Act of Congress. Any provision of law in force at the expira-
tion of such time and in conflict with any such amendment not disapproved shall be of no
further force or effect after such amendment has taken effect.
Id. The Conference Committee Report explains that, while there should be a continued role for the
Supreme Court in promulgating amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress maintains
the authority to amend any rule submitted to it by the Court or to install changes on its own. H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 7098, 7107. The House and Senate Judiciary Committees sought to clarify the roles of the
Court and Congress with regard to the Federal Rules of Evidence, thus providing the impetus for
this rules enabling act. See H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d. Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7081, 7091-92; S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), re-
printed in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 7051, 7069-70.
212. 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1976).
213. See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 49 (1984). In deferring to Congress for questions
regarding the Federal Rules of Evidence, Justice Rehnquist stated, "We [the Court] are in truth
merely a conduit when we deal with.., the Federal Rules of Evidence." Id.
214. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-55 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
215. Lloyd v. American Export Lines, 580 F.2d 1179 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 969
(1978). For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text. For examples
of other cases following Lloyd, see supra note 120.
216. Clay v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 722 F.2d 1289 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
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cations of an evidentiary rule.2 17
Although this Article has concluded that courts should not interpret the
"predecessor in interest" language of rule 804(b)(1) expansively, this Article
does not suggest that Congress' construction of the rule reflects ultimate enlight-
enment. Numerous scholars and jurists argue against interpreting rule 804(b)(1)
formalistically because such a construction inhibits the fact-finding process.
218
Moreover, Congress' role in drafting the Federal Rules of Evidence has been
soundly criticized. 2 19 As one commentator stated: "The need for flexibility, the
superior execution of the court and the advisory committee, and the desirability
of regulating court procedure in an orderly fashion, free of the turmoil of the
political arena, all suggest that regulation of federal practice is better left to the
Court."220 Nevertheless, Congress' action with regard to rule 804(b)(1) was rea-
soned. Congress simply elevated policies of fairness over a prevailing trend to-
ward accuracy and restored the exception to its prior historical status. Such
action was defensible in light of the origin of the exception in the fairness princi-
ples of estoppel. Because the rule was enacted pursuant to the legitimate legisla-
tive powers of Congress, it cannot be revised or ignored on a case-by-case basis
by the courts.
VII. CONCLUSION
Resolution of the conflict between the judicial and legislative branches, as
well as the divergent policies advanced by the conflicting interpretations of rule
804(b)(1) among the circuits, is best accomplished by the Supreme Court.
Treatment by the Court would result in a definitive interpretation of the rule.
As demonstrated by this Article, the predictable interpretation by the Court
would be a literal, formalistic application of the rule. Moreover, as developed in
the last section of this Article, inferior courts would be directed to respect legis-
lative rulemaking authority in applying rule 804(b)(1).
A definitive interpretation of rule 804(b)(1) may illuminate the need for
1253 (1984). For a discussion of this case, see text accompanying notes 132-34. For a discussion of
cases following the Clay rules, see supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text.
217. Youngstown Sheet, 343 U.S. at 637-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). In the context of implied
powers of the President, Justice Jackson wrote, "When the President acts pursuant to an express or
implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he pos-
sesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate." Id. at 635. Similarly, courts could
engage in individual rulemaking, if a specific rule provided for such judicial discretion. See, e.g.,
FED. R. EvID. 403. In contrast, Justice Jackson proclaimed, "When the President takes measures
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb....
Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from
acting upon the subject." Youngstown Sheet, 343 U.S. at 637-38. In regard to rule 804(b)(1), then,
an expansive interpretation contrary to the explicit language of the rule is not sustainable.
218. For examples of proponents of liberal application of rule 804(b)(1), see C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 6, § 256; 4 M. WEINSTEIN & M. BURGER, supra note 6, 1 804(b)(1)[04]; 5 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 6, § 1388.
219. See Comment, Powers, supra note 2, at 1079 (arguing that the judiciary should promulgate
procedural rules and the legislature should control federal privilege rules); see also Moore & Bendix,
supra note 2, at 38 (contending that court procedure is best regulated by the judiciary); Comment,
Rulemaking, supra note 2, at 98 (same).
220. Comment, Rulemaking, supra note 2, at 98.
19891
336 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67
amendment. Although time-consuming and complex, the joint judicial and leg-
islative process of rulemaking is the most appropriate mechanism for amend-
ments to this rule of evidence, because a change that re-establishes the original
version submitted by the Court would de-emphasize the fairness attributes of the
American system of adversarial adjudication. Such a change in fundamental
policies requires careful scrutiny by jurists and legislators at the highest levels.
An implicit premise of this Article is that procedural and evidentiary rules
embody and reflect the fundamental policies that a society has chosen to guide
its system of justice. If these rules are inconsistent with underlying, widely ac-
cepted values, the integrity of the adjudicatory process is in tension. This tension
is manifested in conflicting judicial interpretations which, if the issue is of suffi-
cient moment, must be reconciled by the Supreme Court, and possibly, by legis-
lative reevaluation.
